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INTRODUCTION
On September 7, 2016, four of the nation’s newspapers of record
weighed in on the connected crises in crime and policing. The New York
Times revealed the tensions between the Mayor’s office in Chicago and
several community and professional groups over a plan to overhaul
Chicago’s police disciplinary board—a plan developed in the wake of the
shooting of an unarmed teenager, Laquan McDonald, and the release of
a video of that killing.1 The Wall Street Journal related a vigorous defense
of New York City’s “broken windows” policing strategy—a strategy that
has been a recurring source of tension between the city’s minority com-
*. Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, and
Professor of Epidemiology, Columbia University.
**. Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Huge thanks to Kyla
Magun and Remy Grosbard for all their patience and help. Thanks to Darrel Stephens
who generously shared recent data on city-level homicides. Patricio Martinez-Llompart
provided excellent research assistance. Special thanks to Nathan Hess for excellent
cartography. All opinions and errors are our own.
1. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Chicago’s Plan to Toughen Oversight of Police Is Under
Fire, N.Y. Times (Sept. 7, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2cq020E (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Oppel, Plan Under Fire].
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munities and the police, and whose value in crime reduction has been
sharply debated.2 The Washington Post’s lead editorial decried Chicago’s
“deadliest month in two decades” that left city officials at odds over the
basic elements of public safety policy and strategic responses to the
seemingly intractable violence.3 The Chicago Tribune weighed in as well.
In it, Chicago Police Superintendent Eddie Johnson declared that the
crisis is “not a police issue, it’s a society issue,” pointing to the need for
stricter gun controls.4
I. EXPLORING THE TENSION BETWEEN POLICE AND COMMUNITIES
Violence and homicide are both community and police issues in
every city; they are also political and managerial challenges for mayors
and local government. Yet shared concerns can be sites of contestation,
not collaboration. Consider Chicago, where homicides jumped from 423
in 2014 to 762 in 2016,5 while nonfatal shootings also spiked from 2,5996
to 3,5507 during the same period. Chicago’s spike in shootings and
homicides became a political question in the 2016 presidential election.8
The city’s turmoil over its devastating homicide and shooting rates, and
reports of a police pullback in the midst of this crisis,9 are framed by
2. Pervaiz Shallwani & Mara Gay, NYPD Defends Its Policing Strategy, Wall St. J.
(Sept. 7, 2016, 8:45 PM), http://on.wsj.com/2cHe15O (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
3. Editorial, Chicago’s Violence Is a ‘Police Issue’—at Least in Part, Wash. Post
(Sept. 7, 2016), http://wpo.st/1A-x1 [http://perma.cc/3YPD-YCYX].
4. Jeremy Gorner, Peter Nickeas, Elvia Malagon & Alexandra Chachkevitch, Top
Cop After Violent Holiday Weekend: ‘It’s Not a Police Issue, It’s a Society Issue,’ Chi. Trib.
(Sept. 6, 2016, 10:54 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-
chicago-violence-labor-day-tuesday-20160906-story.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
5. Amanda Wills, Sergio Hernandez & Marlena Baldacci, 762 Murders. 12 Months. 1
American City., CNN (Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.cnn.it/2ivRtDS [http://perma.cc/BSK8-
6D2V].
6. Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Ends 2014 with Fewer Homicides, but Shooting Victims
Up 14 Percent, Chi. Trib. (Jan. 3, 2015, 9:50 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/ct-chicago-crime-year-end-met-20150101-story.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
7. Crimesider Staff, Chicago Saw More 2016 Murders than NYC, LA Combined, CBS
News (Jan. 2, 2017, 1:45 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/chicago-murders-shootings-
2016-more-than-new-york-city-los-angeles-combined/ [http://perma.cc/29JK-MBJH].
8. See, e.g., John Kass, Chicago Violence Permeates Presidential Election, Townhall
(Sept. 30, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://townhall.com/columnists/johnkass/2016/09/30/
chicago-violence-permeates-presidential-election-n2225196 [http://perma.cc/9QEQ-
TNPN]. President Donald Trump recently threatened federal intervention unless
Chicago’s city leaders can control its “horrible carnage.” See Theodore Schleifer & Joshua
Berlinger, Trump Says He’ll Send in Feds if Chicago Doesn’t Fix ‘Horrible Carnage Going
On,’ CNN, http://cnn.it/2j3amBE [http://perma.cc/UT5X-VDQG] (last updated Jan.
25, 2017, 5:07 PM).
9. Max Kapustin et al., Univ. of Chi. Crime Lab, Gun Violence in Chicago, 2016, at
24 (2017), http://urbanlabs.uchicago.edu/attachments/store/2435a5d4658e2ca19f4f225
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deep community distrust of the police in the wake of fatal police
shootings,10 as well as by strong resistance from police unions to com-
munity and city efforts to strengthen civilian oversight of police and
increase discipline of police officers who violate law and policy.11 For
example, just a few days after August ended with sixty-eight homicides in
the city, Chicago’s police union, the Chicago Fraternal Order of Police,
urged its officers not to work overtime shifts on the 2016 Labor Day
holiday weekend.12 The timing of this pointed expression of police
resistance and defiance in the midst of a crisis of violence suggests the
depth of the social and political conflict between the community, the
police, and the city government. And while it is hard to link this
resistance to police conduct on the street, there was indeed evidence of a
police pullback in the form of reduced street stops.13
b810ce0dbdb9231cbdb8d702e784087469ee3/UChicagoCrimeLab+Gun+Violence+in+Chi
cago+2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/68UA-3QRP] (noting an 80% decrease in police stops “a
few months before rates of gun violence in Chicago began to increase”).
10. See Police Accountability Task Force, Recommendations for Reform: Restoring
Trust Between the Chicago Police and the Communities They Serve 1 (2016),
http://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZM6K-TF8E] (explaining the purpose of the task force is to provide
recommendations to help rebuild trust with policing infrastructure); see also U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Investigation of the Chicago Police Department 15 (2017) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Investigation of the Chicago Police Department], http://www.justice.gov/
opa/file/925846/download [http://perma.cc/838M-A2P9] (“The pattern or practice of
unreasonable force [which includes fatal shootings], coupled with the recurrence of
unaddressed racially discriminatory conduct by officers further erodes community trust
and police effectiveness.”); Rob Arthur & Jeff Asher, Gun Violence Spiked—and Arrests
Declined—in Chicago Right After the Laquan McDonald Video Release, FiveThirtyEight
(Apr. 11, 2016, 3:53 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/gun-violence-spiked-and-
arrests-declined-in-chicago-right-after-the-laquan-mcdonald-video-release/
[http://perma.cc/57NC-KV4F]; Miles Bryan, Gun Deaths in Chicago Reach Startling
Number as Year Closes, NPR News (Dec. 28, 2016, 4:37 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/
12/28/506505382/gun-deaths-in-chicago-reach-startling-number-as-year-closes
[http://perma.cc/54SA-YA3v]; John Byrne, Emanuel Blames Chicago Crime Uptick on
Officers Second-Guessing Themselves, Chi. Trib. (Oct. 13, 2015, 6:30 AM), http://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-emanuel-fetal-police-met-20151012-story.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
11. See, e.g., Dan Hinkel, Chicago Police Set New Advisory Guidelines on Discipline,
but Language Criticized by DOJ Appears, Chi. Trib. (Feb. 1, 2017, 9:14 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-police-discipline-
matrix-met-20170201-story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Jeremy
Gorner, Nearly 2 Dozen Chicago Cops Disciplined for Faulty Dashboard Cameras, Chi.
Trib. (Jan. 7, 2016, 6:56 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/
editorials/ct-chicago-police-disciplined-met-20160106-story.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
12. Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police Union Calls for Officers Not to Work Overtime on
Labor Day Weekend, Chi. Trib. (Aug. 31, 2016, 8:48 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.
com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-police-labor-day-overtime-fop-met-20160831-
story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
13. Kapustin et al., supra note 9, at 24.
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Chicago is not alone in its crisis and in its conflicts between citizens
and police. Baltimore was the scene of three days of demonstrations—
sometimes violent—following Freddie Gray’s arrest, his death while in
police custody, and his funeral.14 Gray’s death occurred in 2015, a year
when Baltimore’s 344 homicides set a modern record15 before tapering
off in 2016 to 318. That total made 2016 the second-deadliest year on
record.16 Reports from Baltimore suggested a police pullback,17 similar to
Chicago, following the indictments of six officers who were participants
in Gray’s arrest and eventual death in custody.18 The rancor between
police and city government peaked after the acquittal of the first four of
the officers tried19 and was followed by lawsuits by the officers against the
State Attorney, alleging defamation and malicious prosecution among
other claims.20 The demands by the police in Baltimore go well beyond
civil damages: Officers and their union representatives have called for
the disbarment of the elected former prosecutor, a sign of the depth of
the enmity between police and government as well as between police and
citizens.21
A. Factors Producing Tension Between Communities and Police
Three factors drive tensions between citizens, rank-and-file police,
and big-city mayors in these and other cities: police officers’ resentment
of both political and community pushback, rank and file hostility to legal
interventions and reform, and increased police killings and use of force,
particularly in communities of color.
14. Paul Schwartzman, At Gray’s Funeral, Outrage over the Way in Which He Died,
Wash. Post (Apr. 27, 2015), http://wpo.st/UCZW2 [http://perma.cc/E3PZ-46AW].
15. Kevin Rector, National Homicide Spike in 2015, Reflected in New FBI Data,
Remains Daily Reality in Baltimore, Balt. Sun (Sept. 26, 2016, 6:20 PM), http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-homicide-data-20160926-story.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
16. Kevin Rector, In 2016, Baltimore’s Second-Deadliest Year on Record, Bullets
Claimed Targets and Bystanders Alike, Balt. Sun (Jan. 2, 2017, 6:10 AM), http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-homicides-2016-20170102-
story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
17. Richard A. Oppel Jr., West Baltimore’s Police Presence Drops, and Murders Soar,
N.Y. Times (June 12, 2015), http://nyti.ms/2jBxJkv (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
18. Justin Fenton, Freddie Gray Case: Judge Allows Malicious Prosecution Lawsuit
Against Mosby to Proceed, Balt. Sun (Jan. 6, 2017, 7:03 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.
com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-mosby-lawsuit-to-proceed-20170106-story.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
19. Jess Bidgood, Another Baltimore Police Officer Acquitted in Freddie Gray Case,
N.Y. Times (July 18, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2orZCfx (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
20. Nero v. Mosby, No. MJB-16-1288, 2017 WL 386537, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 27, 2017)
(granting in part and denying in part the motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims).
21. Ryan M. McDermott, Marilyn Mosby Never Should Have Charged Officers in
Freddie Gray Death, Lawyers Say, Wash. Times (July 27, 2016), http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jul/27/marilyn-mosby-never-should-have-charged-
officers-i/ [http://perma.cc/XA7M-FLG9].
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First, in the wake of events such as the Freddie Gray homicide or the
revelations of the police-shooting death of Laquan McDonald in
Chicago,22 criticism of the police in cities across the country sparked
acrimony among police officers—not only toward local politicians who
were critical of police but also toward their own managers, who tended to
join in that criticism.23 A Pew Research Center survey of police officers
shows that both the protests against the police and an increase in the
number of fatal attacks on police in recent years24 have made them worry
more about their personal safety.25 Police officer fatalities rose from 123
in 2015 to 135 in 2016, a 10% increase.26 But this is a lower death toll
than the 177 officers killed in 2011 and the 192 officers killed in 2007.27
Despite the decline in killings of police, a small number of recent
premeditated ambushes likely have an outsized effect on police fears.28
The Pew survey also shows that the anecdotal reports of police pullbacks
in Chicago and Baltimore reflect a widely shared view among police: 72%
say officers in their department are now less willing to stop and question
22. Nausheen Husain, Laquan McDonald Timeline: The Shooting, the Video and the
Fallout, Chi. Trib. (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
laquanmcdonald/ct-graphics-laquan-mcdonald-officers-fired-timeline-htmlstory.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
23. See infra notes 31–46 and accompanying text (providing examples of such
viewpoints); cf. Rich Morin et al., Pew Research Ctr., Behind the Badge: Amid Protests and
Calls for Reform, How Police View Their Jobs, Key Issues and Recent Fatal Encounters
Between Blacks and Police 63 (2017), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/
uploads/sites/3/2017/01/06171402/Police-Report_FINAL_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/
UD6S-JP2H] (observing differing levels of sympathy administrators and lower-ranking
officers have toward protesters).
24. Nat’l Law Enf’t Officers Mem’l Fund, Preliminary 2016 Law Enforcement Officer
Fatalities Report 1 fig.1 (2016), http://www.nleomf.org/assets/pdfs/reports/Preliminary-
2016-EOY-Officer-Fatalities-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/VX7J-Y32J] (charting a recent
upward trend in officer fatalities).
25. See Morin et al., supra note 23, at 5 (“About nine-in-ten officers (93%) say their
colleagues worry more about their personal safety . . . .”).
26. See Nat’l Law Enf’t Officers Mem’l Fund, supra note 24, at 1.
27. Officer Deaths by Year: Year-by-Year Breakdown of Law Enforcement Deaths
Throughout U.S. History, Nat’l Law Enf’t Officers Mem’l Fund, http://www.nleomf.org/
facts/officer-fatalities-data/year.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated
Mar. 24, 2016).
28. Christopher Ingraham, Ambush Killings of Police Officers Has Hit a 10-Year
High, Wash. Post: Wonkblog (Nov. 21, 2016), http://wapo.st/2fyiBjk?tid=ss_tw-bottom
[http://perma.cc/3KNG-53Z8]; Joe Mozingo, The Cases Might Be Rare, but These Are
the Killers Cops Fear Most, L.A. Times (Oct. 12, 2016, 9:50 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-cop-killers-snap-story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also
George Fachner & Zoë Thorkildsen, Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., Ambushes of Police:
Environment, Incident Dynamics, and the Aftermath of Surprise Attacks Against Law
Enforcement 71 (2015), http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p340-pub.pdf
[http://perma.cc/83KK-7SH6] (finding violent crime and violence against the police
correlate with ambushes against police at the jurisdictional level and progressive hiring
practices were associated with lower numbers of ambushes).
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suspicious persons.29 Overall, more than eight in ten (86%) say police
work is harder today as a result of high-profile incidents of officer
shootings of citizens and officer fatalities.30
Second, beyond local politics and tensions, sentinel events in
Chicago and Baltimore led to federal interventions that reified criticism
of the police and increased police resentment of such interventions.
Within a year of the trials of the officers in the Freddie Gray homicide
and five months after the Chicago police union urged defiance over
Labor Day weekend, both Baltimore31 and Chicago32 completed
negotiations with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to develop and imple-
ment consent decrees to undertake reforms in policy and practice—
reforms that promise structural changes, remediation of constitutional
violations, and healing of breaches between police and community.33
Chicago and Baltimore are two of twenty-five investigations that the
Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division (CRD) of the DOJ
conducted under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 since 2009.34 The CRD opened and
is currently enforcing nineteen agreements—including fourteen consent
decrees and one postjudgment order—in counties and state agencies
29. Morin et al., supra note 23, at 4.
30. Id. at 15.
31. See Consent Decree, United States v. Police Dep’t of Balt., No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB
(D. Md. Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/925036/
download [http://perma.cc/URB7-XLUK]; see also Camila Domonoske, Baltimore, DOJ
Reach Agreement on Consent Decree for Baltimore Police, NPR (Jan. 12, 2017, 10:56 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/12/509479934/baltimore-doj-reach-
agreement-on-consent-decree-for-baltimore-police [http://perma.cc/TAC3-FRMQ]
(reporting Baltimore agreed to the consent decree to “institute sweeping reforms in
Baltimore’s police department”).
32. Justice Department Announces Findings of Investigation into Chicago Police
Department, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-announces-findings-investigation-chicago-police-department
[http://perma.cc/9W5F-D4SC].
33. The future implementation of these agreements is uncertain. In response to
questions about the Chicago consent decree during his confirmation hearing for Attorney
General, Senator Jeff Sessions refused to commit to honoring the agreement. See Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Nomination of Jeff Sessions to Be Attorney General of the United
States, Questions for the Record, Questions from Senator Durbin 4 (2017),
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Sessions%20Responses%20to%20Durbi
n%20QFRs.pdf [http://perma.cc/L3HJ-NPFJ] (“[T]here are concerns with the impact of
using consent decrees for policy purposes and that caution should be used in these
cases.”). In Baltimore, the DOJ has sought a postponement of a hearing to finalize the
details of the consent decree and delay implementation of the agreement to allow for time
to brief the presidential administration on the proposed agreement. See Kevin Rector,
Consent Decree Hearing Postponed to Give Justice Department Time to Brief Trump
Administration on Agreement, Balt. Sun (Jan. 20, 2017, 6:52 PM), http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-consent-decree-delay-
20170120-story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
34. See Special Litigation Section Cases and Matters, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/special-litigation-section-cases-and-matters0#police
[http://perma.cc/V99M-FLK7] (last visited Feb. 4, 2017).
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that are under federal court supervision to implement such
agreements.35 Since the inception of “pattern and practice” interventions
in the 1990s, a total of forty police agencies have entered into either
stipulated settlements or consent decrees, committing local police to a
series of court-supervised structural and policy reforms.36 These
agreements between local entities and the DOJ require extensive changes
in policy and practice—and in some cases structural changes in functions
including recruitment and discipline—and a cessation of the consti-
tutional violations that precipitated the interventions.37
Police officers often view DOJ interventions and other efforts aiming
to enhance police accountability and constitutional compliance as a
condemnation of their police work.38 These reform efforts can provoke
resentment among the rank and file (and union leadership) and some
bitterness at the labeling of their actions as extralegal or tinged with
racism.39 In some places, police have pushed back. Officers in Seattle
sought court intervention to stop the implementation of new use of force
guidelines that were created through the 2012 DOJ consent decree.40 In
Boston, no officers answered the Commissioner’s call for volunteers to
conduct a pilot program to test the use of body-worn cameras.41 When
35. Id.
36. See Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Civil Rights Division’s Pattern and
Practice Police Reform Work: 1994–Present 3 (2017), http://www.justice.gov/
crt/file/922421/download [http://perma.cc/DPT3-TDBJ]; see also Goldie Taylor, More
than 20 U.S. Cities Are Currently Under a DOJ Consent Decree, but Do They Really
Work?, Blue Nation Rev. (May 27, 2015), http://archives.bluenationreview.com/more-
than-20-u-s-cities-are-currently-under-a-doj-consent-decree-but-do-they-really-work/
[http://perma.cc/WZ99-RX4S].
37. See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing
Reform, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 12 (2009) (noting the 1992 “[Rodney] King incident
highlighted the inadequacy of existing solutions for achieving [police] reform”); Stephen
Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 3189, 3244–47 (2014)
(listing DOJ structural police reform investigations and negotiated settlements between
DOJ and police departments); see also Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police
Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 St.
Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 3, 13 (2003) (expounding on the role of litigation and the civil rights
movement in bringing on police reform). See generally Debra Livingston, Police Reform
and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 815, 850
(1999) (discussing the mechanisms of 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a)–(b) (1994)).
38. Morin et al., supra note 23, at 5 (reporting police officers view protests as
motivated by “anti-police bias”).
39. Simone Weichselbaum, The Problems with Policing the Police, TIME,
http://time.com/police-shootings-justice-department-civil-rights-investigations/
[http://perma.cc/U46M-VWZX] (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (describing efforts by local
forces to “fight back” against DOJ action); see also Morin et al., supra note 23, at 81–83
(reporting that police officers blame anti-police bias and “long-standing animosity” toward
police for recent protests).
40. Mahoney v. Holder, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1217–18 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
41. Denise Lavoie, Volunteers Lacking for Boston Police Body Camera Program,
WBUR News (Aug. 14, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/news/2016/08/14/boston-police-
body-camera-volunteers [http://perma.cc/27CQ-M9Z9].
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the Commissioner ordered 100 officers to participate,42 the Boston Police
Patrolmen’s Association (BPPA) tried to halt the program
(unsuccessfully).43
In New York City, police unions asserted that court-ordered mea-
sures aimed at accountability violate their collective bargaining rights.
They used this argument in an unsuccessful motion to intervene and
overturn the settlement and order resulting from Floyd v. City of New York,
a 2013 opinion finding Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations in
the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD’s) “stop-and-frisk” pro-
gram.44 The Second Circuit denied the intervenor motion, citing the
city’s right to voluntarily dismiss its own appeal of the case while also
reinforcing the boundaries of management prerogatives in the collective
bargaining issues.45 Indeed, the panel expressed “serious reservations
about the prospect of allowing a public-sector union to encroach upon a
duly-elected government’s discretion to settle a dispute against it.”46
These episodes of police resistance—if not defiance—reveal tensions not
just between communities and police but also between police and elected
officials in the executive branches over police discretion in everyday
tactical decisions and, more generally, over the autonomy of police to
craft strategies for controlling crime.
Third, the connection between race, aggressive police tactics, and
police killings has widened the breach in trust between citizens and
police—especially Black citizens and police.47 Police killings, often highly
publicized and increasingly visible on citizen or police videos, have
42. Zeninjor Enwemeka, Ahead of Ruling on Pilot Program, Boston Police
Commanders Say They Will Wear Body Cameras, WBUR News (Sept. 8, 2016),
http://www.wbur.org/news/2016/09/08/boston-police-command-staff-body-cameras
[http://perma.cc/9DMJ-TVUF].
43. Bos. Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n v. City of Boston, No. 16-2670-B, at 1 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Sept. 9, 2016), http://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2016/09/
20160912093831348.pdf [http://perma.cc/HJ5V-7Q4T]. The court denied the motion for
injunctive relief, citing to the binding obligations of a Memorandum of Understanding
between the BPPA and Boston to implement a voluntary Body Worn Camera experiment.
Id. at 19. The court also rejected BPPA’s collective bargaining argument. Id. at 14.
44. See 770 F.3d 1051, 1055–56 (2d Cir. 2014) (providing background on police
unions’ motions to intervene). See generally Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd I), 959 F.
Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding the city liable for violating the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments through its stop-and-frisk program), aff’d, 770 F.3d 1051; Tracey
L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as
a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 159, 162–63 (2015) [hereinafter Meares,
Programming Errors] (explaining stop-and-frisk policies are best understood as top-down
programs).
45. Floyd, 770 F.3d at 1058–61.
46. Id. at 1060.
47. See Carl Bialik, Why Are So Many Black Americans Killed by Police?,
FiveThirtyEight (July 21, 2016, 1:24 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-are-so-
many-black-americans-killed-by-police/ [http://perma.cc/T567-NAB9] (exploring why
“Black Americans are more than twice as likely as white Americans to be killed by police
officers”).
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sparked intense anger in Black communities.48 The Washington Post
counted 963 persons shot and killed by police in 2016, a 5% decline from
the 991 killings in 2015.49 Other crowd-sourced websites provide slightly
different counts, which differ from the accounts of newspapers in small
ways owing to differences in inclusion rules, the availability of details of
the incidents, and the time windows for each data source.50 However, all
agree that official government records, which rely on voluntary reporting
by police agencies, substantially undercount police shootings.51
48. Daniel Funke & Tina Susman, From Ferguson to Baton Rouge: Deaths of Black
Men and Women at the Hands of Police, L.A. Times (July 12, 2016, 3:45 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-police-deaths-20160707-snap-htmlstory.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing encounters of Black men and women who died
following encounters with police between 1999 and 2016, noting the existence of
recordings in some cases and describing community responses); see also Carol E. Lee,
Obama Says Police Killings of Two Black Men Should Trouble All Americans, Wall. St. J.
(July 7, 2016, 8:47 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/two-police-killings-of-black-men-part-
of-pattern-of-racial-disparity-obama-says-1467919272 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(recounting President Obama’s statements highlighting the feelings of injustice that
communities of color have felt following police shootings).
49. Fatal Force, Wash. Post, http://wapo.st/police-shootings-2016 [http://perma.cc/
Y9U6-BNNX] (last visited Feb. 4, 2017). Comprehensive and reliable data on nonfatal
police shootings are nonexistent, although some cities maintain databases that track
police shootings. See, e.g., BPD Officer Involved Use of Force, Open Balt. (Feb. 2, 2017),
http://data.baltimorecity.gov/Public-Safety/BPD-Officer-Involved-Use-Of-Force/3w4d-
kckv [http://perma.cc/QBJ3-LF8J].
50. See Franklin E. Zimring, How Many Killings by Police, 2016 U. Chi. Legal F. 691,
701–04 [hereinafter Zimring, How Many Killings] (explaining the shortcomings of various
reporting methodologies); Joscha Legewie & Jeffrey Fagan, Group Threat, Police Officer
Diversity and the Deadly Use of Police Force 61 tbl.A1 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Working Paper No. 14-512, 2016), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2778692 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (comparing data sources on
police killings). For example, the website http://www.killedbypolice.net/ reported that
1,151 people were killed by police in 2016, nearly 200 more deaths than were reported by
the Washington Post for the same year. See Fatal Force, supra note 49; Killed by Police 2017,
Killedbypolice.net, http://www.killedbypolice.net/ [http://perma.cc/GR7T-UQEN] (last
visited Feb. 4, 2017). This website reported 776 police killings of citizens in 2013 and 1,111
in the following year. Killed by Police 2013, Killedbypolice.net, http://www.killedbypolice.
net/kbp2013.html [http://perma.cc/5UG2-HTYL] (last visited Feb. 26, 2017); Killed by
Police 2014, Killedbypolice.net, http://www.killedbypolice.net/kbp2014.html [http://
perma.cc/RKH7-FCS2] (last visited Feb. 26, 2017). The one-year disparity no doubt
reflects increased attention to police killings and more detailed reporting on incidents.
See, e.g., Eliot C. McLaughlin, We’re Not Seeing More Police Shootings, Just More News
Coverage, CNN (Apr. 21, 2015), http://cnn.it/1GbjQN9 [http://perma.cc/AAG9-27QG].
51. See Zimring, How Many Killings, supra note 50, at 703 (asserting media reporting
of police killings is more comprehensive than police data that “report only the police
department’s version of events”); see also Franklin E. Zimring & Brittany Arsiniega,
Trends in Killings of and by Police: A Preliminary Analysis, 13 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 247, 251
(2015) (“[T]he published count of killings by police is incomplete, unaudited, and varies
between sources; estimates say that these killings are underreported by as much as 20%.”).
For an in-depth discussion of the limitations of the federal data on police killings, see
Daniel Bier, By The Numbers: How Often Do Cops Kill?, Skeptical Libertarian (July 13,
2016), http://blog.skepticallibertarian.com/2016/07/13/by-the-numbers-how-often-do-
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FIGURE 1: POLICE JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES AND POLICE OFFICERS KILLED IN
THE LINE OF DUTY, 2000 TO 2015
Figure 152 shows the trends since 2000 in police killings of civilians
and killings of police in the line of duty. If both of these types of killings
cops-kill/ [http://perma.cc/WXT7-VP99]. In this graph, Daniel Bier compares crowd-
sourced datasets from the Guardian, the Washington Post, and the website “Fatal
Encounters” with statistics from the Bureau of Justice Statics and the FBI. Id.
52. For data on police justifiable homicides see, FBI, Expanded Homicide Data Table
14, 2006–2010, FBI: Unif. Crime Reporting, http://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
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are a source of tension and conflict between police and communities,
then there is an asymmetry in the reactions to them. Figure 1 shows
justifiable homicides by police in order to provide a longer trend line in
police killings. These are widely regarded as an undercount of police
killings, including both justifiable homicides and other police killings of
citizens.53 The trend lines in Figure 1 are moving in different directions.
Killings of police vary from year to year, but the overall trend line shows a
decline since 2000.54 However, killings by police have been on the rise
since 2000.55 The increase in police killings of citizens, the spread of
citizen and police videos of these killings, and the publicity these videos
receive in the media are flashpoints of anger and resentment, partic-
ularly in minority communities. The emergence of active advocacy
groups and widespread protests have increased attention to police
killings and widened the breach between citizens and police in minority
communities.56
It is hard to reconcile the downward trend in killings of police—and
of homicides nationally57 and in most cities58—with the rise in killings by
police. This disconnect is not lost on advocacy groups such as Black Lives
Matter, and it heightens distrust of police. For their part, police
responses to these trends seem disproportionate, although ambush
killings may play an outsized role in their fears.
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10shrtbl14.xls [http://perma.cc/67BG-N8VY]
(last visited Mar. 26, 2017); FBI, Expanded Homicide Data Table 14, 2011–2015, FBI: Unif.
Crime Reporting, http://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2015/tables/expanded_homicide_data_table_14_justifiable_homicide_by_weapon_la
w_enforcement_2011-2015.xls [http://perma.cc/749U-ZQXT] (last visited Mar. 26,
2017); FBI, Table 2.16–Justifiable Homicide by Weapon, LEOs, 1996–2000, FBI: Unif.
Crime Reporting, http://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2000 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Mar. 26, 2017); FBI, Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR)
Expanded Homicide Data Table 13, 2001–2006, FBI: Unif. Crime Reporting,
http://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2005 [http://perma.cc/YKU5-ANUN] (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 26, 2017). For data on police officers killed in
the line of duty, see FBI, Table 1: Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed, 2000–2009,
FBI: Unif. Crime Reporting, http://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2009 [http://perma.cc/VF27-
CY6E] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017); FBI, Table 1: Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously
Killed, 2006–2015, FBI: Unif. Crime Reporting, http://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2015/
tables/table_1_leos_fk_region_geographic_division_and_state_2006-2015.xls [http://
perma.cc/ZGL9-K5RA] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
53. See Zimring & Arsiniega, supra note 51, at 247 (describing problems with
accuracy of data regarding killings by police officers).
54. See supra Figure 1.
55. See supra Figure 1.
56. See McLaughlin, supra note 50 (describing protests against police killings); see
also About the Black Lives Matter Network, Black Lives Matter,
http://blacklivesmatter.com/about (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited
Feb. 27, 2017) (describing the mission and work of the Black Lives Matter movement).
57. See infra Figure 4.
58. See infra Figure 3.
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The available data on police shootings of civilians show connections
between police killings and race—trends that confirm what is common
knowledge for many Black citizens and communities.59 Professors Joscha
Legewie and Jeffrey Fagan suggest that police killings reflect a broader
context of racial conflict and racial threat in cities, and show that police
killings of Blacks from 2014 to 2016 were a function more of racial
disparities in population than racial metrics of crime or violence.60 Other
research, as well as Legewie and Fagan’s study, demonstrates that the
absence of racial diversity among police contributes to racial gaps in
police killings of Black citizens.61 Using data from 2005 to 2012 in sixteen
states, a research team at the Harvard School of Public Health found
stark racial and ethnic disparities of eight to one in police killings.62
Another study compared police killings of citizens to police contacts
through street stops, traffic stops, and arrests and showed that racial
disparities in police killings in 2012 were explained by large racial
differences in exposure to police and rates of police contact.63
Research by Professor Roland Fryer examining police use of force in
Houston, one of the nation’s largest cities, shows a nearly 50% greater
incidence of use of force by police in encounters with Black or Latino
59. See, e.g., Gregory B. Hladky, Lawmakers: Cases of Police Bias, Abuse Create Deep
Distrust, Hartford Courant (Apr. 2, 2015, 6:45 PM), http://www.courant.com/politics/hc-
police-minority-community-distrust-20150402-story.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (reporting lawmakers’ descriptions of “the distrust and fear of police within
Connecticut’s black and Hispanic communities and their doubts about the pace of
reform”); see also President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 9–11 (2015), http://cops.usdoj.gov/
pdf/taskforce/TaskForce_FinalReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/L5WG-MT4A] (discussing
the discrepancy between White and non-White communities’ trust of the police).
60. Legewie & Fagan, supra note 50, at 34 (describing how the study’s data “reveal a
race-specific pattern in the ways in which the police respond to crime”).
61. Id. at 34–35 (finding “evidence that a high proportion of black officers might not
necessarily reduce the number of officer-involved killings directly, but mitigates the role of
group threat and thereby eases tensions between the police and African-American
communities”); see also Sean Nicholson-Crotty, Jill Nicholson-Crotty & Sergio Fernandez,
Will More Black Cops Matter? Officer Race and Police-Involved Homicides of Black
Citizens, 77 Pub. Admin. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 22) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (finding that increasing the percentage of Black officers will likely
not decrease violence unless the police department has reached a “critical mass” of Black
officers).
62. Catherine Barber et al., Homicides by Police: Comparing Counts from the
National Violent Death Reporting System, Vital Statistics, and Supplementary Homicide
Reports, 106 Am. J. Pub. Health 922, 924 (2016) (citing the rate of “legal intervention
homicides” as 0.48 per 100,000 population for Blacks compared to 0.06 for Asians).
63. Ted R. Miller et al., Perils of Police Action: A Cautionary Tale from Police Data
Sets, 23 Inj. Prevention 27, 29 (2017) [hereinafter Miller et al., Perils of Police Action]
(finding the ratio of people law enforcement killed or medically treated for injury by law
enforcement is “surprisingly consistent by race/ethnicity” and “[b]lacks have high arrest
and stop rates, and per capita are much more likely than whites to die at the hands of
police” (citations omitted)).
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persons but no disparity by race in shootings by police.64 Justin Feldman’s
subsequent analyses of Professor Fryer’s Houston results showed that, in
fact, Blacks were nearly five times more likely to be shot relative to Whites
and Latinos were nearly twice as likely to be shot relative to Whites.65
Professor Fryer searched for evidence of racial bias in police shootings in
Houston, using statistical models to identify intentional bias. He found
none. Feldman’s analyses of the same data examined statistical discrim-
ination66—or disparate treatment of Black and Latino suspects by police
in their use of force—and showed large racial disparities.67 Overall, the
evidence of racially disparate police enforcement across cities reinforces
longstanding beliefs among Black citizens about disparate treatment at
the hands of the police and helps spread a narrative of an uneven bur-
den that Black citizens bear in police–citizen encounters.68
64. Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of
Force 3–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22399, 2016),
www.nber.org/papers/w22399.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
65. Justin Feldman, Roland Fryer Is Wrong: There Is Racial Bias in Shootings by
Police, Scholars at Harv.: Justin Feldman Blog (July 12, 2016), http://scholar.harvard.
edu/jfeldman/blog/roland-fryer-wrong-there-racial-bias-shootings-police [http://
perma.cc/BP5V-NJ37].
66. Statistical discrimination reflects differences in the rates of an event by race, after
controlling for race-specific and plausible nonrace factors that might explain such
differences. Racial bias looks for evidence of intent to discriminate, independent of
evidence of racial disparities. See id. (explaining the difference between statistical
discrimination and racial bias in the context of discriminatory policing).
67. Id. (finding “black people were over 5 times as likely to be shot relative to whites
[and] [l]atinos were roughly twice as likely to be shot versus whites”).
68. Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody & Donald P. Haider-Markel, Pulled Over:
How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship 9–13 (2014) (discussing the development
and institutionalization of race-based policing practices); see also Rod K. Brunson, “Police
Don’t Like Black People”: African-American Young Men’s Accumulated Police
Experiences, 6 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 71, 95 (2007) (“The combination of frequent
involuntary police contact, coupled with what study participants considered poor
treatment during such encounters, contributed to an accumulated body of unfavorable
experiences that collectively shaped young men’s views of police.”); Rod K. Brunson &
Ronald Weitzer, Police Relations with Black and White Youths in Different Urban
Neighborhoods, 44 Urb. Aff. Rev. 858, 864–65 (2009) (observing “racial and
neighborhood differences” between Black and White neighborhoods such that White
youth “had a less troubled relationship with and more positive views of the police than
Black youth” and “police treatment of residents appeared to be less problematic in the
White neighborhood”); Tom R. Tyler, Policing in Black and White: Ethnic Group
Differences in Trust and Confidence in the Police, 8 Police Q. 322, 323–24 (2005)
(examining racial discrepancies in community trust in the police); Patricia Y. Warren, The
Continuing Significance of Race: An Analysis Across Two Levels of Policing, 91 Soc. Sci. Q.
1025, 1026 (2010) (“Perceptions of racial profiling are used to illustrate the link between
more widespread racialized stories about police behavior and individual attitudes toward
police.”); Melissa Healy, Blacks Are More Likely to Be Killed by Police, but That’s Because
They’re More Likely to Be Stopped, Study Says, L.A. Times (July 25, 2016, 3:00 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-cops-race-injury-20160725-snap-
story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (examining the Miller et al. study, see
Miller et al., Perils of Police Action, supra note 63).
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B. A Vortex of Forces
The swirling factors addressed above—spiking homicide rates in
some cities, police distrust of citizens generally, the protests of Black
citizens in particular, police resistance to court oversight to remedy
constitutional violations, an expressed reluctance by police to engage
with crime suspects, police shootings and killings of Black citizens,
distrust of police, and withdrawal from police–citizen cooperation in
communities hardest hit by violence—describe a vortex of forces that can
potentially form a political crisis. The depth of the gap in trust between
citizens and police is alarming and seemingly intractable.
Even as shootings by police have led to widespread anger and
political activism among minority citizens, shootings of police have stirred
up deep anger and feelings of alienation among police. Officers are
skeptical of the motivations and goals of the citizen protests: Far more
officers attribute the protests to anti-police bias than to sincere concerns
about police accountability.69 Most police see no systemic factors in their
profession that lead to police killings.70 This clashes with data from
general population surveys in which the majority of respondents view
police shootings and killings of citizens as symptomatic of deeper
problems in that profession.71 And there are differences by race in these
perceptions not only among the general public but also within police
departments between Black and White officers. These different
perceptions are not only on policing matters but also on the contexts of
racial inequality broadly in American life.72 That police would pull back
from their duties73 in the face of criticism and serious public safety
concerns in several cities highlights the deep cynicism and despair
animating this crisis.74
69. Morin et al., supra note 23, at 5 (“Two-thirds of officers (68%) say the
demonstrations are motivated to a great extent by anti-police bias; only 10% in a separate
question say protesters are similarly motivated by a genuine desire to hold police
accountable for their actions.”).
70. Id. (“Some two-thirds [of police officers surveyed] characterize the fatal
encounters that prompted the demonstrations as isolated incidents and not signs of
broader problems between police and the black community––a view that stands in sharp
contrast with the assessment of the general public.”).
71. Id. (“In a separate Pew Research Center survey of U.S. adults, 60% say these
incidents are symptoms of a deeper problem.”).
72. See id. at 6–7 (“[V]irtually all white officers (92%) but only 29% of their black
colleagues say that the country has made the changes needed to assure equal rights for
blacks.”).
73. This process is often referred to as “de-policing.”
74. One commentator, Radley Balko, views police self-reporting of a pullback to be a
petulant response that “insults the profession generally as well as those officers who
continue to perform their jobs at high levels of professionalism . . . . [Balko] imagine[s]
that doctors, soldiers, lawyers and members of just about every other profession would feel
the same way.” Radley Balko, Why Are Police Groups and Their Advocates Advancing a
Theory that Makes Police Officers Look Terrible?, Wash. Post (Jan. 23, 2017),
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These intersecting conflicts are the subject of this Mini-Symposium.
Our purpose is to identify social, historical, and institutional contexts to
understand the current set of crises. In this Essay, we create a historical
context of episodic periods of violence epidemics over the past fifty years
and provide perspective on previous eras to inform thinking about the
present. We also discuss the dynamics of the cynicism and distrust that
have created the current crisis of legitimacy between citizens and police
and describe the connections between the separate sources of tension.
We avoid proscriptions but urge exploration of the dynamics underlying
these tensions as a first step to remediate distrust and build cooperation
as a pathway to public safety.
Two additional essays contribute to the Mini-Symposium. Professor
John Donohue explores the causal influences on crime in 2015 and
points to declining prison populations, declining police numbers, and
growing markets for illegal drugs as promising candidates.75 He goes on
to suggest that de-policing, to the extent that it is occurring, does not
explain the rising homicide rates in cities nationwide. Professor Tracey
Meares suggests that even as we try to understand troubling increases in
violent crime in a number of cities, we need to promote the building of
trust between the police and the communities they serve.76 We are also
grateful for the encouragement of FBI Director James Comey, who has
helped put many of the issues discussed here in the national spotlight
and has pushed for the analysis that, we hope, this symposium
contributes to.77
http://wpo.st/It1X2 [http://perma.cc/ST2A-6RK7]. Despite police officers’ rational fear
of ambush, their views do not reflect the actual risk of job-related injuries—police are not
represented amongst the industry sectors at the highest risk for fatal workplace injuries.
Cf. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, Census of Fatal
Occupational Injuries, Fatal Work Injuries by Adjusted Industry 14 (2015),
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0014.pdf [http://perma.cc/5YNM-N89P]
(“Private construction had the highest count of fatal injuries in 2015, but the private
agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting sector had the highest fatal work injury rate.”).
But we also could consider their actions to be a model of a rational, not petulant, actor:
the possibility that employees—such as police officers—with an underspecified job
description and a high degree of discretion might well prefer inaction for which they are
unlikely to be blamed as opposed to action for which they might be held responsible.
75. 2015 saw a large jump in the murder rate, even as that jump was from historically
low levels and as property crime remained quite low. See John J. Donohue, Comey, Trump,
and the Puzzling Pattern of Crime in 2015 and Beyond, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 1297, 1321
fig.8 (2017).
76. Tracey L. Meares, The Path Forward: Improving the Dynamics of Community–
Police Relationships to Achieve Effective Law Enforcement Policies, 117 Colum. L. Rev.
1355 (2017) [hereinafter Meares, The Path Forward].
77. James B. Comey, Introduction, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 1233 (2017) [hereinafter
Comey, Introduction].
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE TRENDS
The recent increases in crime and violence create several challenges
for police executives, community leaders, and governance. Crime is
complicated and quite local in its impacts; it is city-specific and
concentrated in particular neighborhoods within cities.78 While one city
may be shaken by a homicide spike, its overall number and rate of
homicides may be quite small compared to those of others. Explanations
to date have sought to link the recent rise in homicides to a “Ferguson
Effect”: Police retreat from “proactive policing” in the wake of height-
ened scrutiny of incidents of excessive force and lethal police violence by
local residents and the press.79 However, this provocative claim of a
strong causal effect lacks systematic evidence and a careful counter-
factual analysis.80 At the same time, other descriptions have blurred our
understanding of the rise in homicides by placing homicide in a
heterogeneous category of violent crime, which may mask the sharp
edges of the homicide spikes in some cities and the issues that the spikes
raise concerning neighborhoods and policing and local governing.81
78. Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Divergent Social Worlds: Neighborhood
Crime and the Racial–Spatial Divide 7–8 (2010) (describing the importance of
neighborhood and area-specific crime studies, as opposed to general city-wide crime
studies).
79. James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, Remarks Delivered at the University of Chicago Law
School: Law Enforcement and the Communities We Serve: Bending the Lines Toward
Safety and Justice (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/law-enforcement-
and-the-communities-we-serve-bending-the-lines-toward-safety-and-justice [http://
perma.cc/KYL2-JW8Z] [hereinafter Comey, Remarks at University of Chicago]; Heather
Mac Donald, The Ferguson Effect, Wash. Post: Volokh Conspiracy (July 20, 2016),
http://wpo.st/JkPX2 [http://perma.cc/FG7B-UNJB]; see also Richard Rosenfeld, Nat’l
Inst. of Justice, Documenting and Explaining the 2015 Homicide Rise: Research
Directions 18–23 (2016), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249895.pdf [http://
perma.cc/VE6P-74D9] (acknowledging several different potential definitions of the
“Ferguson Effect” and exploring each in depth).
80. Neil Gross, Is There a ‘Ferguson Effect’?, N.Y. Times (Sept. 30, 2016),
http://nyti.ms/2jKMOAh (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the
“Ferguson Effect” and its origins and highlighting the emerging scholarly empirical
literature); Eric Lichtblau, FBI Director Says ‘Viral Video Effect’ Blunts Police Work, N.Y.
Times (May 11, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2jKKnO9 (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
Ames Grawert & James Cullen, What the Data Tell Us About Crime and the ‘Ferguson
Effect,’ Brennan Ctr. for Justice Blog (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.brennancenter.org/
blog/what-data-tell-us-about-crime-and-%E2%80%98ferguson-effect%E2%80%99
[http://perma.cc/94CW-6XJE] (describing and defining the “Ferguson Effect” but
drawing attention to a study that did not find the Effect to be causing an increase in
crime). For an alternate explanation, see Matthew Desmond & Andrew V. Papachristos,
Why Don’t You Just Call the Cops?, N.Y. Times (Sept. 30, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2jKCGY2
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (proposing increases in crime result from members
of the public being less likely to call the police for help in the wake of highly publicized
incidents of police brutality rather than police officers being less active as a result of public
scrutiny as proponents of the “Ferguson Effect” suggest).
81. Matthew Friedman, Ames C. Grawert & James Cullen, Brennan Ctr. for Justice,
Crime in 2016: A Preliminary Analysis 11 (2016), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
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Because the evidence is scant on these causal claims, we need a richer
and more disciplined understanding to know exactly what is occurring.
Developing this richer understanding requires a more granular
perspective of crime changes in communities. The first step is to measure
and describe recent trends in ways that are helpful to each stakeholder
group and to provide a basis of evidence from which cities can shape
their responses.
The second step is to give tempered and realistic perspectives on the
details of the changes in crime and violence, a task that Professor
Donohue has begun.82 What is not known—and it is an essential
question—is whether the increases of the past two years signal the
beginning of a longer-term trend in violent crime or whether the current
increase in a few cities is a temporary disruption in the longer-term
trends. If there is a longer-term trend in the works, it is essential to
identify which cities are in the midst of it and which might realize an
increase at some point in the future. These questions apply as much
across neighborhoods within cities as they do across cities.
The third step is to understand the contexts and circumstances
within cities that explain why city-specific homicide and other violent
crime rates have remained stable or increased. These are processes and
social structures that are at work at the city level or across larger entities
such as counties and regions. Police officials, local political actors, and
neighborhood organizations and city planners recognize that homicides
tend to cluster in a small number of neighborhoods and that those
troubled places are likely to remain among the most troubled areas in
their cities over time. Researchers have called these places “poverty
traps”83 and use this concept to explain not only why there are outbreaks
of violence in specific places but also why these are places where the
dynamics of delegitimation and de-policing take place in tandem and
why citizen withdrawal has taken place contemporaneously with police
withdrawal.84
default/files/publications/Crime_2016_Preliminary_Analysis.pdf [http://perma.cc/
PM7Q-98WQ] (comparing change in crime rates and murder rates and noting trends that
“indicate[] there may be a problem with murder in . . . specific cities, not that there is a
national trend of rising crime”).
82. See Donohue, supra note 75.
83. Samuel Bowels, Steven N. Durlauf & Karla Hoff, Poverty Traps 2 (2011); Robert J.
Sampson & Jeffery D. Morenoff, Durable Inequality: Spatial Dynamics, Social Processes,
and the Persistence of Poverty in Chicago Neighborhoods, in Poverty Traps, supra, at 176,
201 (2011) (demonstrating “communities displaying elevated levels of legal cynicism and
lower levels of collective efficacy were those that had been exposed to poverty in 1970 and
increases in poverty from 1970 to 1990”).
84. See, e.g., David S. Kirk & Andrew V. Papachristos, Cultural Mechanisms and the
Persistence of Neighborhood Violence, 116 Am. J. Soc. 1190, 1228 (2011) (finding
“cultural frames have a constraining influence” and “cynicism constrains choice if
individuals presume that the law is unavailable or unresponsive to their needs, thus
pushing individuals to engage in their own brand of social control” such as violence).
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A. The Past Two Years
Across the nation’s thirty largest cities, crime is as likely to have
increased in the past two years as it is to have remained stable or
declined. Table 1 shows the changes in overall crime and violent crime
for these cities in descending order of population for the two-year period
ending in late December 2016. Averaging across the thirty cities, the rate
of violent crime increased by more than four times the rate of increase
for overall crime. Eight cities reported declines in violent crime rates,
and twelve cities reported declines in overall crime rates. Nine of the
thirty cities did not provide data.
TABLE 1: CRIME IN THE THIRTY LARGESTU.S. CITIES, 2015 TO 201685
2015 2016 2015 2016
Crime Rate
per
100,000
Crime Rate
per 100,000
% Change in
Crime Rate
Violent
Crime Rate
per 100,000
Violent Crime
Rate per
100,000
% Change in
Violent Crime
Rate
New York City 1,245.6 1,266.3 1.70% 470.2 469.7 -0.10%
Los Angeles 2,900.9 3,052.3 5.20% 575.4 652.1 13.30%
Chicago 3,947.6 4,305.7 9.10% 996 1,157.60 16.20%
Houston 5,332.2 5,337.9 0.10% 924.8 1,008.50 9.10%
Philadelphia 3,878.2 3,629.2 -6.40% 938.5 884.4 -5.80%
Phoenix NA NA NA NA NA NA
San Antonio 5,521.4 6,805.5 23.30% 513.3 783.1 52.50%
San Diego 2,446.0 2,137.8 -12.60% 359 283.5 -21.00%
Dallas 4,765.7 4,563.6 -4.20% 742.4 817.9 10.20%
San Jose 2,678.8 2,460.5 -8.10% 288.8 316.7 9.70%
Austin 4,028.2 3,712.7 -7.80% 319.4 351.2 10.00%
Jacksonville NA NA NA NA NA NA
San Francisco 8,856.9 7,719.0 -12.80% 2,056.20 1,942.10 -5.50%
Indianapolis NA NA NA NA NA NA
Columbus NA NA NA NA NA NA
Fort Worth NA NA NA NA NA NA
Charlotte 4,753.8 5,587.0 17.50% 702.7 860.6 22.50%
Seattle 3,797.4 3,578.1 -5.80% 528.1 516.8 -2.10%
Denver 4,127.8 4,287.8 3.90% 585.4 589.2 0.60%
El Paso NA NA NA NA NA NA
Detroit 6,633.9 6,405.4 -3.40% 1,865.90 1,734.40 -7.00%
Washington, D.C. 5,449.1 5,084.4 -6.70% 896.4 866.9 -3.30%
Boston 3,009.6 2,856.5 -5.10% 684.3 639.9 -6.50%
Memphis NA NA NA NA NA NA
Nashville 3,905.5 3,850.0 -1.40% 785.2 795.7 1.30%
Portland NA NA NA NA NA NA
Oklahoma City 4,371.0 4,891.6 11.90% 687.4 734.5 6.90%
Las Vegas NA NA NA NA NA NA
Baltimore 6,446.3 6,049.7 -6.20% 1,576.90 1,668.10 5.80%
Louisville 6,160.4 6,403.6 3.90% 2,233.00 2,407.10 7.80%
Average - - 1.30% - - 5.50%
85. The data for this table was compiled by the Brennan Center for Justice using
crime data obtained directly from police departments in these cities. See Friedman et al.,
supra note 81, at 4 tbl.1, 15 (providing data and explaining the methodology).
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The largest increase in violent crime was in San Antonio (52.5%),
followed by Charlotte (22.5%).86 The largest decrease in violent crime
was in San Diego (-21.0%), followed by Detroit (-7.0%). The largest
increases in overall crime rates were in San Antonio (23.3%) and
Charlotte (17.5%).87 The largest decreases in overall crime rates were
observed in San Francisco (-12.8%) and San Diego (-12.6%).
86. Charlotte data may be skewed by two nights of protests and demonstrations with
property destruction following the September 20, 2016, police shooting of Keith Lamont
Scott. See Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, Man Is Shot in Charlotte as Unrest Stretches to
Second Night, N.Y. Times (Sept. 21, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2jPjR3C (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
87. But see supra note 86 (noting potentially skewed data based on protests).
88. Id. at 6 tbl.2.
TABLE 2: MURDER IN THE THIRTY LARGESTU.S. CITIES, 2015 TO 201688
2015 Total
Murders
2016 Total
Murders
% Change
in Murders
2015 Murder
Rate per
100,000
2016
Murder
Rate per
100,000
% Change in
Murder Rate
New York City 352 359 2.10% 4.1 4.2 1.20%
Los Angeles 283 276 -2.60% 7.1 6.9 -3.30%
Chicago 493 727 47.40% 18.1 26.6 47.10%
Houston 303 345 13.90% 13.3 14.9 12.10%
Philadelphia 273 293 7.50% 17.4 18.6 6.80%
Phoenix NA NA NA NA NA NA
San Antonio 94 144 52.90% 6.4 9.6 50.00%
San Diego 37 48 30.40% 2.6 3.4 28.90%
Dallas 170 204 20.20% 13 15.4 18.30%
San Jose 30 51 70.60% 2.9 4.8 66.70%
Austin 24 52 115.40% 2.5 5.2 106.30%
Jacksonville NA NA NA NA NA NA
San Francisco 52 56 8.30% 6.3 6.8 8.20%
Indianapolis NA NA NA NA NA NA
Columbus NA NA NA NA NA NA
Fort Worth NA NA NA NA NA NA
Charlotte 60 56 -7.40% 7.3 6.8 -7.60%
Seattle 24 26 8.30% 3.5 3.7 4.90%
Denver 54 56 3.10% 7.9 7.9 0.30%
El Paso NA NA NA NA NA NA
Detroit 300 293 -2.50% 42.5 41.5 -2.40%
Washington, D.C. 162 144 -10.90% 24.1 21 -12.70%
Boston 39 49 26.70% 5.8 7.3 24.50%
Memphis NA NA NA NA NA NA
Nashville 63 85 34.50% 9.6 12.7 32.40%
Portland NA NA NA NA NA NA
Oklahoma City 74 95 28.60% 11.7 14.7 25.90%
Las Vegas 134 168 25.30% 9 11.3 25.10%
Baltimore 343 309 -9.90% 55.2 49.8 -9.70%
Louisville 87 111 27.30% 12.9 16.4 26.80%
Average - - 14.40% - - 13.10%
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As salient as violent crime is, it is a heterogeneous category that
includes murder, robbery, assaults, and a small set of other crimes.89
Much of the attention to crime spikes in the past two years has focused
on shootings and murders. Murder is the most politically important
crime, attracting greater media and political attention than other crimes.
Table 2 shows the changes in murders and murder rates for 2015 to 2016
for the thirty largest U.S. cities. The murder rate decreased in the past
year in four cities, and the number of murders decreased in five cities.90
The rest of the twenty-two cities providing data showed increases in these
areas in each of the one-year periods. The overall murder count rose by
14.4%, while the murder rate rose by 13.1%. The largest increase for
both time periods was in Austin, where the change in the murder count
was 115.4% and the change in the murder rate was 106.3%. The largest
decrease for both time periods was in Washington, D.C., where the
change in the murder count was -10.9% and the change in the murder
rate was -12.7%.
Together, Tables 1 and 2 show only a weak linkage between recent
trends in increasing (or decreasing) overall crime rates, including violent
crime rates, and increases in murder rates. A few cities showed
substantial increases in both overall crime and murder: San Antonio,
Chicago, and Oklahoma City. Many other cities had large increases in
their murder rates but not their overall crime rates: San Jose, San Diego,
Nashville, and Boston, among others. Even limiting the comparison to
violent crime and murder, the trends seem to suggest a distinct pattern
for murder. Murder, then, is different. Its greater salience as a crime is
one reason why there has been a sharp focus on murder and consid-
erable attention to whether the current rise in homicides portends the
end of an era of decline and the onset of a period of instability in
murder.
But conclusions based on short-term trends can mask long-term
trends with richer explanatory powers. Figures 2 and 3 show longer-term
trends for murder in several cities. Figure 2 shows trends for three large
cities. The data start in 1985, one year before a nationwide increase in
homicides concurrent with the epidemic of crack cocaine in American
cities,91 and continue to 2016, more than twenty years into a nationwide
89. FBI, 2016 January–June Preliminary Semi-Annual Uniform Crime Report, FBI:
Unif. Crime Reporting, http://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/preliminary-semiannual-
uniform-crime-report-januaryjune-2016/tables/table-1 [http://perma.cc/F2GU-WTPD]
(last visited Feb. 3, 2017) (defining violent crimes as “murder, rape . . . robbery, and
aggravated assault”).
90. Eight cities did not report data for this analysis.
91. Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 10, 11 (1995) (“Both the murder and the robbery rates peaked in about
1980, declined through the early 1980s, and then climbed again during the late 1980s with
the intensification of the crack epidemic and the ‘war on drugs.’”); Jeff Grogger & Michael
Willis, The Emergence of Crack Cocaine and the Rise in Urban Crime Rates, 82 Rev. Econ.
& Stat. 519, 528 (2000) (“Using two different sources of information to date the
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decline in murders—-a decline felt in both large and small cities, as well
as in suburban and rural areas.92 Murders in these three cities declined
steadily from their similar 1990–1995 peak rates through 2014. Chicago’s
murder rate stabilized at a higher rate than the rates in New York City
and Los Angeles (L.A.). In L.A., a sharp decline from 1993 to 1999 was
followed by an increase through 2002, when the decline resumed. After
nearly a decade of the second decline, the murder rate in L.A. rose
slightly from 2014 to 2016. In New York City, the murder rate continued
its durable secular decline through 2014. After a very small one-year
increase in 2015, the decline in New York City resumed in 2016.
emergence of crack in 27 metropolitan areas across the U.S., our analysis shows that the
arrival of crack cocaine led crime to rise substantially in the late 1980s and early 1990s.”).
92. See Alfred Blumstein & Richard Rosenfeld, Explaining Recent Trends in U.S.
Homicide Rates, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1175, 1175 (1998) (“[The homicide rate]
climbed a full 24% to a peak of 9.8 in 1991, and has been declining markedly since
then . . . .”); Alfred Blumstein, Frederick P. Rivara & Richard Rosenfeld, The Rise and
Decline of Homicide—and Why, 21 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 505, 506–07 & fig.1 (2000)
(“The reasons for the rise in homicide in the latter half of the 1980s, peaking in the early
1990s, and the subsequent equally dramatic decline span both criminology and public
health.”); Jacqueline Cohen et al., The Role of Drug Markets and Gangs in Local
Homicide Rates, 2 Homicide Stud. 241, 241–42 (1998) (discussing recent shifts in
homicide rates); Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four
Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. Econ. Persp. 163, 163 (2004)
(“Homicide rates plunged 43 percent from the peak in 1991 to 2001, reaching the lowest
levels in 35 years.”); see also Franklin E. Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline 3
(2007) (“The data show a very substantial and nationwide drop, across all categories of
serious crime, steadily progressing through the decade.”); Michael Tonry, Why Crime
Rates Are Falling Throughout the Western World, 43 Crime & Just. 1, 1–2 (2014)
(recognizing and exploring causes for parallel dropping crime rates among English-
speaking countries and western Europe).
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FIGURE 2: MURDERS PER 100,000 PERSONS IN THE THREE LARGEST U.S.
CITIES, 1985 TO 201693
Figure 2 has two important lessons. The first is that not all crime or
murder declines are alike. Even in the midst of a robust long-term period
of decline, there are temporary increases. Across these three large cities,
the timing, duration, and magnitude of the spikes within the longer-term
trends vary. These secular declines in fact contain short-term anomalies
that may have city-specific explanations.
The second lesson is that cities may have similarities in slopes or
rates of decline for long periods but also have level differences over time.
Chicago’s decline was more short-lived, but its period of relative
stability—with short-term increases and declines—lasted nearly a decade,
from 2004 to 2014, before the current spike began. What also stands out
from Figure 2 is the magnitude of the two-year spike in Chicago
beginning in 2015. This extraordinary spike in Chicago’s murder rate,
does have analogs in other cities, as we see in Figure 3.
93. The data used to produce this figure are from the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reporting (UCR) program. The FBI’s UCR data from 1975 to 2015 were compiled in one
location by the Marshall Project. See Gabriel Dance, Tom Meagher & Emily Hopkins, The
Marshall Project, Data for Examining Uniform Crime Reporting Data for 68 Major Cities,
GitHub, http://github.com/themarshallproject/city-crime [http://perma.cc/V79G-
JP3Q] [hereinafter Dance et al., UCR Data for 68 Cities] (last visited Mar. 27, 2017).
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
M
ur
de
rs
pe
r
10
0,
00
0
Po
pu
la
to
in
Los Angeles New York Chicago
2017] UNDERSTANDING RECENT SPIKES 1257
FIGURE 3: MURDERS PER 100,000 POPULATION IN TEN U.S. CITIES, 1985 TO
201694
Figure 3 expands the analysis in Figure 2 to include seven additional
cities. The city-specific trends reveal that most cities follow a similar
pattern of increases and declines over time.95 Several patterns emerge
across these city-specific trends. First, Chicago is not alone in a steep
increase in homicide rates starting in 2015. Murder rates also increased
sharply in St. Louis, Baltimore, Milwaukee, and New Orleans. Indeed, it
is worth noting that many of the cities with the highest murder rate in
2016—including St. Louis, 59.3, and New Orleans, 44.5—are not among
the thirty largest cities.96 Thus, while Chicago’s size makes it account for a
94. Id.
95. Gabriel Dance & Tom Meagher, Crime in Context: Violent Crime Is Up in Some
Places, but Is It Really a Trend?, Marshall Project (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.
themarshallproject.org/2016/08/18/crime-in-context#.6HgY9cx0 [http://perma.cc/
C66P-A527] (finding sixty-eight cities could fit into four patterns of crime); see also Dance
et al., UCR Data for 68 Cities, supra note 93 (providing the table of data used to analyze
crime in sixty-eight cities over the forty-year period presented in Dance & Meagher,
supra).
96. See Jeff Asher, U.S. Cities Experienced Another Big Rise in Murder in 2016,
FiveThirtyEight (Jan. 9, 2017, 2:32 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/u-s-cities-
experienced-another-big-rise-in-murder-in-2016/?ex_cid=story-twitter [http://perma.cc/
L5QW-LLKB]. The below chart uses murder rate data from this article.
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disproportionate share of the total increase in homicides during this
time, its per capita increase is in line with these other cities that suffered
increases as well.
Second, the trends of several cities show continued stability in their
murder rates, and any increases in murder rates since 2012 were modest.
These cities include Houston, New York City, L.A., and Philadelphia.
These four cities also had long-term declines in murder rates dating to
the early 1990s. Thus, the long-term trend is one of stability for these
places after a lengthy period of decline. Baltimore and St. Louis also had
sharp declines in their murder rates followed by short-term sharp spikes
of one to two years.
A third lesson in Figure 3 is from the clustering of six cities with
similar homicide rates and similar long-term trends. Despite the
increases in murder rates in Chicago and Milwaukee, the longer-term
trends for this group suggest periods of decline marked by periods of
short-term increases. The other four cities have overall higher murder
rates over the past twenty-two years and more volatility in those murder
rates. New Orleans in particular has very large increases and declines
over time, even if we discount the sharp spike in the two years
immediately after Hurricane Katrina.97
U.S. Cities with the Highest 2016 Murder Rates
City 2016 Murder Rate (per 100K)
St. Louis 59.3
Baltimore 51.2
Detroit 44.9
New Orleans 44.5
Cleveland 35.0
Newark, N.J. 33.0
Memphis, Tenn. 31.9
Chicago 27.9
Kansas City, Mo. 26.4
Atlanta 23.9
97. Michael Leitner et al., The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Reported Crimes in
Louisiana: A Spatial and Temporal Analysis, 63 Prof. Geographer 244, 258 (2011) (finding
“murder and aggravated assault rates even exceeding prestorm averages by the end of
December 2007” in New Orleans); Mark VanLandingham, Letters, 2007 Murder Rates in
New Orleans, Louisiana, 98 Am. J. Pub. Health 776, 776 (2008) (“The murder rate for
New Orleans remains stubbornly elevated at extraordinarily high levels since Hurricane
Katrina and has yet to begin a decline to even prestorm levels, which were very high in the
first place.”); Mark VanLandingham, Murder Rates in New Orleans, La, 2004–2006, 97 Am.
J. Pub. Health 1614, 1615 (2007) (“Compared with rates in cities of comparable size,
murder rates in New Orleans have been substantially higher since at least 2004, and the
disparity has been worsening since then.”); Sean P. Varano et al., A Tale of Three Cities:
Crime and Displacement After Hurricane Katrina, 38 J. Crim. Just. 42, 48 (2010) (noting
“[i]t seems safe, however, to conclude that the Katrina-related diaspora did not
correspond with a wide-scale dramatic increase in crime”).
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One important way to distinguish and assign meaning to the short-
term spikes in Chicago and Milwaukee compared to the spikes in St.
Louis and Baltimore is to develop an understanding of longer-term
stability in murder rates and how city-specific factors contribute to that
stability. Given these differences in the longer-term trends, it would not
be unreasonable to predict that city-specific factors contribute to the
longer-term stability in murder rates. Also, given the longer-term trends
of increase followed by decline over a longer time window, it would not
be unreasonable to predict that the current spikes will be of shorter
duration and that a mean reversion to the long-term trend could begin
within a year or two. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that the
current increases would depart from the longer-term trend over the past
three decades. In the cities with more volatile murder rates over the past
twenty years, such predictions would be far more uncertain and prone to
error without a much deeper understanding of the city-specific factors:
the neighborhood contexts where spikes are concentrated, changes in
the socio-economic landscape that may have preceded or accompanied
these spikes, changes in the predicate crimes (such as robberies) that
often have parallel trends with murder, and factors specific to the social
organization of crime and its opportunities.
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FIGURE 4: MURDERS PER 100,000 POPULATION, UNITED STATES, 1960 TO
201698
Efforts to explain these short-term murder increases have been
expansive but with little clear empirical or analytic basis. One
explanation centers on an increasing tendency among young males to
settle disputes with lethal violence—violence that is made easier by ready
access to guns.99 Another narrative centers on increasing tensions among
highly localized gangs protecting small territories whose boundaries are
easily transgressed, provoking attacks that are cast as territorial
98. The data used to produce this figure are from the FBI’s UCR report. See FBI,
Table 1: Crime in the United States by Volume and Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants, 1996–
2015, FBI: Unif. Crime Reporting, http://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-
u.s.-2015/tables/table-1 [http://perma.cc/2EZ2-FM5W] (last visited Mar. 27, 2017). Data
from 1960 to 2014 are available from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics Data
Tool. See FBI, Estimated Murder Rate from 2009–2014, Unif. Crime Reporting Statistics,
http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/TrendsInOneVar.cfm (To create the
table using this tool, choose “United States - Total” for option a, “murder rate” for option
b, and enter the range from 1960 to 2014 for option c, then click “get table.”) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Mar. 27, 2017). The rate for 2016 was estimated by
the Brennan Center in Friedman et al., supra note 81, at 1 (noting that the murder rate
was projected to rise by 13.1% from 2015–2016).
99. See Julie Bosman & Mitch Smith, As Chicago Murder Rate Spikes, Many Fear
Violence Has Become Normalized, N.Y. Times (Dec. 28, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2kqLFuY
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting criminology professor Arthur Lirigio’s
assertion that “in addition to the proliferation of guns and deepening poverty, personal
disputes among gang members have led to more shootings”).
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defense.100 Still other explanations suggest an inability of police to solve
murders and arrest the killers, leaving them free to kill again.101
Murder rates across American cities are heterogeneous. Disputes
over drug sales, domestic homicides, and felony murders are all part of
the story. Some murders are of innocent bystanders who are fatally
wounded by stray bullets that are intended for others. Nevertheless, there
are some constants in the demography, epidemiology, and social
contexts of murder. We turn to those next.
B. The Past Half Century
Over the past five decades, there have been three distinct homicide
epidemics in the United States.102 The first started in the mid-1960s and
lasted for nearly a decade before a short-term decline through the end of
the 1970s. The second began in the late 1970s, had a relatively short
duration, and was followed by a precipitous decline in the murder rate
through 1985. The third coincided with the crack epidemic that started
in the late 1980s and continued through the early 1990s.103 Although the
onset and peak of each epidemic varied by city in its duration and (with
minor variations) its intensity, all major cities assumed the same contours
of recurring and cascading homicide epidemics. Figure 4 shows the
national trend. City-specific trends for the period 1975 to 2015 reveal
that most cities followed a similar pattern over time.104
There is no shortage of explanations for each of the three homicide
epidemics in Figure 4. Explanations include increasing racial residential
segregation,105 increasing poverty and the effects of deindustrialization
on U.S. cities,106 the proliferation of guns and increased firearm
100. See id. (quoting Chicago Police Superintendent Eddie Johnson on the
proliferation of shootings that were targeted attacks by gang members).
101. Catherine Lee, The Value of Death: Multiple Regression and Event History
Analyses of Homicide Clearance in Los Angeles County, 33 J. Crim. Just. 527, 530–33
(2003) (showing that homicide clearance rates are lower in L.A. in murders of non-White
victims and that clearances via arrests are faster for White-victim homicides, combining to
leave the killers of non-White victims free to kill again).
102. See supra Figure 4.
103. Grogger & Willis, supra note 91, at 528 (finding “the effect of the emergence of
crack was substantial” and “in the absence of crack cocaine, the crime rate in 1991 would
have remained below its previous peak in the early 1980s”).
104. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
105. Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the
Making of the Underclass 8 (1993) (“Residential segregation is the institutional apparatus
that supports other racially discriminatory processes and binds them together into a
coherent and uniquely effective system of racial subordination.”).
106. Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and
Urban Inequality, in Crime and Inequality 37, 53 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds.,
1995) (suggesting “roots of urban violence” were possibly the result of a cohort of youth
that “spent its childhood in the context of a rapidly changing urban environment unlike
that of any previous point in U.S. history” when “the concentration of urban poverty and
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availability through both legal and illegal channels,107 and the spread of
street gangs in U.S. cities.108 Each of these explanations has some
empirical and theoretical traction for specific places and specific eras.
But common factors that can be plausibly linked to the temporal and
spatial patterns in these homicide epidemics can provide a perspective, if
not an explanation, that unifies these three tightly linked epidemics.109
This Essay proposes that the link is a series of recurring and cumulative
epidemics within cities of illicit drug use and illegal distribution, and that
these epidemic patterns are shared across cities.
Each of these three periods of increasing and then decreasing
murder rates experienced concurrent epidemics of illicit drugs. The first
period from the mid-1960s to the late-1970s, with its increasing and then
decreasing murder rate, was concurrent with the onset and decline of a
heroin epidemic. The heroin epidemic of the 1960s and 1970s hit most
of the large and small cities in the United States.110 Heroin addiction was
linked to violence through distinct mechanisms. The first was acquisitive
other social dislocations began increasing sharply”); see also Elijah Anderson, Code of the
Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City 108 (1999) (noting when
jobs disappear “the underground economy of drugs and crime often emerges to pick up
the slack”); Douglas S. Massey, Categorically Unequal: The American Stratification System
205–07 (2007) (linking extreme inequality and spatial concentration of poverty to the
adaptation of cultural mechanisms that sustain violence).
107. See Alfred Blumstein & Daniel Cork, Linking Gun Availability to Youth Gun
Violence, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1996, at 5, 5 (“By examining time trends in age-
specific arrest rates for homicide (gun homicide compared to non-gun homicide) and
similar trends in drug-related arrest rates (juveniles compared to adults), the role of gun
availability . . . is identified as a probable cause of these homicide trends.”); Matthew
Miller et al., Rates of Household Firearm Ownership and Homicide Across US Regions
and States, 1988–1997, 92 Am. J. Pub. Health 1988, 1992 (2002) (finding “across US
regions and states, and for virtually every age group, higher rates of household firearm
ownership were associated with higher rates of homicide”); see also Philip J. Cook & Jens
Ludwig, The Social Costs of Gun Ownership, 90 J. Pub. Econ. 379, 380 (2006) (finding
“the social cost of an additional household acquiring a handgun depends on the rate of
violence and the existing prevalence of guns, but under a wide range of assumptions is
greater than $100 per year”).
108. Jacqueline Cohen & George Tita, Diffusion in Homicide: Exploring a General
Method for Detecting Spatial Diffusion Processes, 15 J. Quantitative Criminology 451, 453
(1999) (“Features of the recent homicide epidemic . . . suggest that certain social
processes—notably, illegal drug markets and gang rivalries—may be important for
explaining the pattern and mechanisms of the spread of homicides.”).
109. See, e.g., Robert M. Lawless, Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Thomas S. Ulen,
Empirical Methods in Law 23–24 (2d ed. 2016) (discussing the conditions to establish a
causal relationship between two factors).
110. Leon G. Hunt, Recent Spread of Heroin Use in the United States, 64 Am. J. Pub.
Health 16, 16 (Supp. 1974) (“Aggregate treatment program data seem to show that the
peak period of new heroin use occurred everywhere . . . about 1968, but when local data
are corrected for addicts’ delay in entering treatment, this synchronous national
‘epidemic’ becomes a sequence of local peaks ranging from 1967 to the present.”); Bruce
D. Johnson et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner City: Impact on Hard-Drug Users and the
Community, 13 Crime & Just. 9, 14–15 (1990) [hereinafter Johnson et al., Drug Abuse in
the Inner City] (describing the rise of heroin use in inner cities from 1965 to 1973).
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violence—users and addicts committed crimes to get access to funds to
buy drugs.111 Robberies of other drug users, drug sellers, or individuals
unrelated to such transactions were the primary income-generating
mechanisms. Robbery rates soared—the linkage between robbery and
homicide was even analyzed by a presidential commission on crime in
the late 1960s.112 The second mechanism linking heroin to violence was
competition and conflicts between drug sellers, and the third (though
rare) was violence resulting from the psychoactive effects of drugs.113
The mid-twentieth century heroin epidemic subsided (though it
never disappeared), but within a short time, a cocaine epidemic took
hold—an epidemic concurrent with the second period of the increase
and decrease of the murder rate.114 The marketing of cocaine in this era
differed extensively from the heroin trade in the previous decade.115
Retail heroin sales were less frequent due to the long duration of a
heroin high and a tightly controlled illicit market. In turn, the volume of
sales was far lower, and sales were more often done furtively; open-air
markets were atypical.116 Cocaine marketing, on the other hand,
flourished in outdoor open-air bazaars. Cocaine’s psychotropic effects
were different: Cocaine was a stimulant, in contrast to heroin, so users
could repurchase often and maintain their high over time while doing
other activities.117 In turn, the markets that sold cocaine in the street
111. Paul J. Goldstein, The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual
Framework, 39 J. Drug Issues 493, 495–96 (1985) (“The economically compulsive model
suggests that some drug users engage in economically oriented violent crime, e.g.,
robbery, in order to support costly drug use.”).
112. See President’s Comm’n on Law Enf’t & Admin. of Justice, The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society 18–19 (1967), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9JAN-3YEZ].
113. Goldstein, supra note 111, at 503 (“Drugs and violence are seen as being related
in three possible ways: the psychopharmacological, the economically compulsive, and the
systemic.”); see also Paul J. Goldstein et al., Crack and Homicide in New York City, 1988: A
Conceptually Based Event Analysis, 16 Contemp. Drug Probs. 651, 684 (1989) (identifying
the “crack distribution ‘system’ as the primary source of crack-related homicidal violence”
and noting few instances of “psychopharmacological or economic compulsive homicides
involving crack”).
114. Andrew Golub, Bruce D. Johnson & Eloise Dunlap, Subcultural Evolution and
Illicit Drug Use, 13 Addiction Res. & Theory 217, 222 (2005) (explaining four distinct
phases to drug eras and referencing their application to the “[c]rack era of the late 1980s
and early 1990s”); Bruce D. Johnson et al., The Rise and Decline of Hard Drugs, Drug
Markets, and Violence in Inner-City New York, in The Crime Drop in America 164, 168
(Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000) (referencing the “Crack/Cocaine Era” of
the 1980s).
115. Eloise Dunlap & Bruce D. Johnson, The Setting for the Crack Era: Macro Forces,
Micro Consequences (1960–1992), 24 J. Psychoactive Drugs 307, 318–20 (1992).
116. Id. at 318–19.
117. See Johnson et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner City, supra note 110, at 15–16
(noting “cocaine gained the reputation of a ‘status drug’ that was relatively innocuous”).
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served a wider population.118 Cocaine highs were shorter lasting, and
users were more likely to make several purchases of smaller quantities in
a shorter period of time.
The emergence and visibility of drug markets in this era attracted
police attention in the form of undercover buy-and-bust operations that
resulted in a high volume of arrests.119 One perverse effect of street-level
enforcement was the disruption of drug-selling organizations, creating
market instability and encouraging conflict and violence as new sellers
moved to occupy the vacuums created by drug enforcement.120 This
conflict resulted in what Professor Paul Goldstein has called “systemic
violence” within the illicit drug trade.121
As Figure 4 shows, there was a drop in homicide and violence at the
end of this epidemic period over a five-year interval ending in 1985, as
these markets and the population of users stabilized. In any epidemic,
there is a period of adoption and spread among susceptible persons, but
at some point, anyone who is motivated to try a drug has tried and either
continued its use or set it aside.122 As the supply of new users declined, so
too did the epidemic, and in turn, drug markets declined in size and
activity. While homicide levels remained higher than twenty years earlier,
the decline over that five-year period was precipitous.
The final period of increase and decrease of the murder rate
coincided with the spread of crack cocaine—smokable cocaine—across
U.S. cities starting in the mid-1980s. Street drug markets revived,
expanded, and became more active.123 Crack was sold in smaller
quantities, with vials of two-to-four rocks costing about $20 to $30, and
since the high was short lived, users continued to make purchases over a
118. See id. at 23–26 (discussing the range of clientele for cocaine dealers); see also
Jerome H. Skolnick et al., The Social Structure of Street Drug Dealing, 9 Am. J. Police 1,
18–20 (1990) (describing marketing arrangements of cocaine deals).
119. Lynn Zimmer, Proactive Policing Against Street-Level Drug Trafficking, 9 Am. J.
Police 43, 47–48 (1990) (describing New York City’s Operation Pressure Point as “an
aggressive, proactive strategy with both crime-fighting and order-maintenance goals”).
120. See Goldstein, supra note 111, at 497 (describing such behavior as an example of
“systemic violence”); see also Jeffrey Fagan & Ko-lin Chin, Violence as Regulation and
Social Control in the Distribution of Crack, in Drugs and Violence: Causes, Correlates, and
Consequences 8, 24–35 (Mario de la Rosa et al. eds., 1990), http://archives.drugabuse.
gov/pdf/monographs/103.pdf [http://perma.cc/KV4T-5XK8] (discussing the
connection between violence and drug selling); Johnson et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner
City, supra note 110, at 39 (describing the limited impact of police arrests of crack-user
dealers).
121. Goldstein, supra note 111, at 497–501.
122. Roberta Ference, Diffusion Theory and Drug Use, 96 Addiction 165, 170 (2001)
(finding considerable support for “the application of the diffusion model in a variety of
planned interventions relating to drug use”); S.A. Patten & J.A. Arboleda-Florez, Epidemic
Theory and Group Violence, 39 Soc. Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology 853, 853, 855
(2004) (describing epidemic diseases and their application to “psychiatric epidemiological
research” to explain “events that might otherwise be difficult to explain”).
123. See Johnson et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner City, supra note 110, at 16–17.
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sustained period of time.124 Young men were attracted to the drug trade
in large part because of the promise of incomes far above what they
could earn in conventional work.125 Crack cocaine was a very strong
stimulant, and sexual stimulation was one of its effects. This led to the
transformation of sex markets as crack was marketed together with sex,
and women users often exchanged sex for drugs.126 Competition among
crack-distribution organizations––which also sold other drugs, including
cocaine and heroin-–-was often fierce and violence was common.127 Street
gangs entered the crack trade, also selling cocaine and heroin, and their
competition was another context in which violence often erupted.128
Crack spread across cities, and its arrival in each city was tightly
linked with a surge in violence, including homicides.129 In many in-
stances, drug sales occurred in open-air markets located in the poorest,
highest-crime, and most heavily minority-population neighborhoods of
the cities.130 These also were the places where access to legal work, both
socially and spatially, was severely limited, and the local formation of
relatively lucrative drug markets incentivized drug selling for those shut
out of legal work.131 For others, drug selling offered a measure of dignity
124. Craig Reinarman et al., The Contingent Call of the Pipe: Bingeing and Addiction
Among Heavy Cocaine Smokers, in Crack in America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice 77,
83 (Craig Reinarman & Harry Levine eds., 1997) (describing the short nature of the high
and the “strong desire to repeat it”).
125. See Philippe Bourgois, In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio 115 (2d
ed. 2003) (observing “straightforward refusal to be exploited in the legal labor market
pushes [dealers] into the crack economy”); Jeffrey Fagan, Drug Selling and Licit Income
in Distressed Neighborhoods: The Economic Lives of Street-Level Drug Users and Dealers,
in Drugs, Crime, and Social Isolation 99, 100–01 (Adele Harrell & George E. Peterson eds.,
1992) [hereinafter Fagan, Drug Selling and Licit Income] (noting the “profitability of
drug dealing obviously affects the feasibility of different strategies for steering inner-city
youth back to the legal labor market”).
126. Lawrence J. Ouellet et al., Crack Cocaine and the Transformation of Prostitution
in Three Chicago Neighborhoods, in Crack Pipe as Pimp: An Ethnographic Investigation
of Sex-for-Crack Exchanges 69, 85–92 (Mitchell S. Ratner ed., 1993) (describing how the
“financial demands of repeated cocaine use” drove prostitution).
127. See Bruce D. Johnson et al., Emerging Models of Crack Distribution, in Drugs
and Crime: A Reader 56, 65 (T. Mieczkowski ed., 1991) (“[M]ost vertically controlled
crack groups must be able and willing to resort to ruthless violence to instill fear and
respect among competitors and workers alike.”).
128. Blumstein, supra note 91, at 26–28 (discussing the impact of the drug industry’s
violence on the community and its potential to stimulate violence).
129. Grogger & Willis, supra note 91, at 523.
130. Fagan & Chin, supra note 120, at 9–10 (describing the emergence of crack
markets); see also Ric Curtis, Crack, Cocaine and Heroin: Drug Eras in Williamsburg,
Brooklyn, 1960–2000, 11 Addiction Res. & Theory 47, 56–57 (2003) (discussing the crack
market in Willamsburg, Brooklyn); Johnson et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner City, supra
note 110, at 18–22 (describing structure of crack-selling industries).
131. Fagan, Drug Selling and Licit Income, supra note 125, at 99–101 (discussing the
influence of the drug trade on employment during 1980s crack-cocaine epidemic).
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compared to the noxious conditions of low-wage hourly legal work.132 Put
another way, crack markets opened in the context of the very same
poverty traps where earlier homicide epidemics were the most salient.
The systemic violence that Professor Goldstein described spread in
these cities: Conflicts between dealers and between dealers and cus-
tomers created a context in which violence was the most reliable form of
resolving disputes.133 Dealers themselves were often targets for ordinary
robberies because they carried large amounts of cash and worked on
street corners with little protection from police or others in their drug-
selling clique.134 Violence also was used by drug organizations to
maintain discipline and ensure loyalty so that lower-level retail sellers
would be deterred from skimming profits from the wholesalers.135
As in earlier drug epidemics, the crack-cocaine epidemic eventually
peaked, reaching its apex in the early 1990s, and then began to recede as
the supply of new users was exhausted and older users ceased using
crack. Extraordinary law enforcement resources were allocated to con-
trolling crack markets, including federal as well as local enforcement.136
This combination of intensive criminal justice intervention and the
natural cessation of the crack epidemic in the early 1990s also
contributed to the downward trend in murder and other forms of
criminal violence. Without the impetus of emerging and volatile drug
markets—a major animating feature of the previous three consecutive
epidemics—the next two decades saw a decline in murders across the
country. While there were city-specific trends for short-term disruptions
132. See Bourgois, supra note 125, at 98–99 (discussing crack dealers’ stories of
“rejecting what they considered to be intolerable working conditions at entry-level legal
jobs” and their dependence on the “crack economy for economic survival and personal
dignity”).
133. See Fagan & Chin, supra note 120, at 8–9 (noting “[v]iolence in drug dealing can
be viewed as an extension of behaviors that are associated with efficiency and success in
legitimate businesses”); Johnson et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner City, supra note 110, at
35–38.
134. Fagan & Chin, supra note 120, at 8–9 (noting “in the absence of legal recourse
for legal activities, [street-level] disputes are likely to be settled either by economic reprisal
or violence”); Johnson et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner City, supra note 110, at 27 (“In
addition to evading police, sellers and suppliers must now defend their ‘businesses’ against
robbers, competitors, and ordinary citizens who will call police.”).
135. Fagan, Drug Selling and Licit Income, supra note 125, at 117 (noting that
“violence can be used as a regulatory process or a strategy for organizational maintenance
in an economic activity that falls outside of legal or formal economic control”); Fagan &
Chin, supra note 120, at 8–9 (observing “in the absence of legal recourse for legal
activities, [street-level] disputes are likely to be settled either by economic reprisal or
violence”).
136. Steven R. Belenko, Crack and the Evolution of Anti-Drug Policy 115, 122–24
(1993) (describing the “intensive law enforcement response” to the growth of crack
offenses at federal, state, and local levels); David W. Rasmussen & Bruce L. Benson,
Rationalizing Drug Policy Under Federalism, 30 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 679, 714 (2003)
(describing the growth of law enforcement measures at all levels to address drug crime).
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in the pattern of decline, the absence of these animating contexts helped
keep the disruptions short.
C. A New Epidemic?
The current upward trend, even for the 2015–2016 period, seems to
coincide with an increase in heroin use and abuse of other forms of
opioids across the nation.137 But facts challenge the notion that another
homicide epidemic is underway or that the increase in homicide is
fueled by yet another era of drug addiction and violence in its
distribution networks.
First, the onset of this opioid epidemic predated the recent rise in
homicides. In previous eras, the onset of the epidemics of drugs and
homicide were closely correlated in time and space in urban centers
through the late 1990s.138 The opioid epidemic, mainly in rural America,
began approximately in 2000,139 as homicides were well into their twenty-
year decline. From 2000 to 2014, the rate of drug overdose deaths
increased by 137%—in 2014, about 60% of those excess deaths from drug
overdoses were due to opioid use.140 In 2009, the death rate from opioids
surpassed the death rate from motor vehicle accidents.141 Deaths from
prescription opioid pain medications rose by nearly 400% from 1999 to
2014.142 However, Figure 3 shows that the homicide rate nationally did
not begin to rise until 2015143 in some cities and later in several others.
137. Injury Prevention & Control: Opioid Overdose, Understanding the Epidemic,
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/
[http://perma.cc/7KEQ-S4R4] (last updated Dec. 16, 2016); Dan Nolan & Chris Amico,
Chasing Heroin: How Bad Is the Opioid Epidemic?, PBS: Frontline (Feb. 23, 2016),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-bad-is-the-opioid-epidemic/
[http://perma.cc/735P-3S5F].
138. See, e.g., President’s Comm’n on Law Enf’t & Admin. of Justice, supra note 112,
at 222 (beginning the exploration between drug abuse and violent crimes in the mid-
1960s); Grogger & Willis, supra note 91, at 528 (discussing the correlation between drug
prevalence and violent crime in the crack epidemic).
139. Laxmaiah Manchikanti et al., Opioid Epidemic in the United States, 15 Pain
Physician ES9, ES29–ES30 figs.15 & 16 (2012) (showing a surge in opioid analgesic
overdose deaths and treatment admissions beginning in 1999 and a rate that rose
monotonically through the end of the following decade).
140. Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Opioid Overdose Deaths—United States, 2000–
2014, 64 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 1378, 1378–79 (2016).
141. Leonard J. Paulozzi, Prescription Drug Overdoses: A Review, 43 J. Safety Res. 283,
283, 284 fig.1 (2012).
142. Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Number
and Age-Adjusted Rates of Drug-Poisoning Deaths Involving Opioid Analgesics and
Heroin: United States, 2000–2014 (2016), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/health_
policy/AADR_drug_poisoning_involving_OA_Heroin_US_2000-2014.pdf [http://perma.
cc/8U5L-WY34].
143. See Richard Rosenfeld, supra note 79, at 6 (showing homicide rate increases in
large cities beginning in 2015).
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Second, unlike the drug epidemics from the 1960s to the 1990s,
opioid addiction is more likely to affect Whites than other racial or
ethnic groups and to be centered outside urban areas.144 Heroin and
opioid mortality rates in 2014 were more than two times greater for
Whites than Blacks or Latinos.145 This is in contrast to the 1960s, when
Blacks and Latinos were far more likely to die from heroin than
Whites.146 This shift in the demography of drug abuse relocates the drug–
homicide connection away from the populations and communities most
at risk for homicide mortality.147
Third, the spatial distribution of the opioid epidemic suggests a
diffusion of heroin and opioid use away from the nation’s urban centers
since 2000.148 For example, heroin and opioid overdoses in California in
2013 also were highest in the state’s rural counties, including Shasta,
Placer, and El Dorado counties.149 In general, county-level rates of
overdose deaths from heroin and prescription opioids remained higher
in rural areas than in the urban centers.150 Even without an acute opioid
epidemic in cities, homicide rates in cities have remained higher than in
144. Haeyoun Park & Matthew Bloch, How the Epidemic of Drug Overdose Ripples
Across America, N.Y. Times (Jan. 19, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2jVUlKb (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (visually showing the spread of heroin overdose deaths from a small
set of rural areas in 2003 to much of the western United States and Appalachian areas by
2014).
145. See Nolan & Amico, supra note 137 (“By 2014, whites and Native Americans were
dying at double or triple the rates of African-Americans and Latinos, according to the
CDC.”). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has not yet published heroin or
opioid addiction overdose mortality rates for 2015 or 2016.
146. See Hunt, supra note 110, at 23 (explaining heroin addicts in treatment in 1974
were predominantly Black men); Johnson et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner City, supra note
110, at 14 (explaining heroin use “exploded during the period 1965–73” among
minorities but that since that time “much lower proportions of blacks have been initiating
heroin use”); see also Theodore J. Cicero et al., The Changing Face of Heroin Use in the
United States: A Retrospective Analysis over the Past 50 Years, 71 JAMA Psychiatry 821, 825
(2014) (“Although minority groups were predominant [heroin] users in the 1960s and
1970s, nearly 90% of respondents who began use in the last decade were white.”).
147. Peterson & Krivo, supra note 78, at 13 (noting “the rate of homicide offending
and victimization was six to seven and a half times higher for African Americans than for
whites each year from 2000 to 2005”).
148. See Katherine M. Keyes et al., Understanding the Rural–Urban Differences in
Nonmedical Prescription Opioid Use and Abuse in the United States, 104 Am. J. Pub.
Health at e52, e52 (2014) (recognizing and seeking to explain “the excess burden of
prescription opioid misuse in rural compared with urban areas”); see also Luke Runyon,
Why Is the Opioid Epidemic Hitting Rural America Particularly Hard?, Harvest Pub.
Media (Dec. 22, 2016), http://harvestpublicmedia.org/article/why-opioid-epidemic-
hitting-rural-america-particularly-hard [http://perma.cc/7S9N-T538] (discussing the
influx of opioids in rural areas).
149. Phillip Reese-Presse, See Where California’s Heroin, Opioid Problems Are Worst,
Sacramento Bee (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.sacbee.com/site-services/databases/
article31324532.html [http://perma.cc/M6UL-YZTE].
150. Park & Bloch, supra note 144.
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rural or suburban areas for the past fifty years,151 particularly in places
where racial residential segregation also remains concentrated.152
Explanations for the diffusion include higher rates of opioid pre-
scriptions in rural areas, an outmigration of young adults from cities and
suburbs to rural areas, denser kinship and social networks in rural areas
that may facilitate drug diversion from legal to illegal channels, and
economic stressors that heighten vulnerability to drug use generally.153
Users may also minimize the perceived harm of pharmaceutical opioids,
owing to their oral ingestion that avoids the stigma and health
complications of injection.154
In cities, heroin deaths have also increased since 2010, but the
increase is not skewed by race. St. Louis, for example, is one of the cities
with a sharp spike in murders in the past five years.155 And while the
heroin overdose rate rose in St. Louis from 2010 to 2014, the rate of
heroin overdose deaths was slightly higher for Whites (10.7 per 100,000
persons) than Blacks (10.0 per 100,000 persons).156 The rate increased
from 2013 to 2014 nearly identically for Black and White persons at the
same time that homicides were spiking.157 Yet Black persons were more
likely to be homicide victims during much of this period, despite the
racial balance in heroin overdose deaths.158
Overall, the current two-year increase in homicide rates in cities may
be driven or animated by factors that differ from the commonalities of
the drug epidemics that coincided with the previous three cascading
151. Erica L. Smith & Alexia Cooper, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide in the U.S.
Known to Law Enforcement, 2011, at 11 figs.19 & 20 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/hus11.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (showing elevated homicide
rates in large cities with populations greater than 500,000).
152. John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults, US2010 Project, The Persistence of Segregation
in the Metropolis: New Findings from the 2010 Census 21 (2011), www.s4.brown.edu/
us2010/Data/Report/report2.pdf [http://perma.cc/QEB9-6MUK]; see also Massey &
Denton, supra note 105, at 223 (reviewing census data and reaffirming the prominence of
racial segregation in urban areas).
153. Keyes et al., supra note 148, at e54 (discussing factors related to the spread of
heroin use from urban to rural areas starting in the late 1990s).
154. See, e.g., Don C. Des Jarlais et al., The Transition from Injection to Non-Injection
Drug Use: Long-Term Outcomes Among Heroin and Cocaine Users in New York City, 102
Addiction 778, 782 (2007) (identifying self-reported reasons users stopped injecting,
including issues of stigmata and self-image).
155. See supra Figure 3.
156. St. Louis Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Health, Drug-Poisoning Deaths Involving Heroin, St.
Louis County, Missouri 2 (2016), http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Health/
Health%20Data/Heroin%20Deaths%20Profile%2022416%20FINAL.pdf
[http://perma.cc/TV23-MB9N].
157. Id. at 4.
158. Alex Ihnen, Understanding St. Louis Homicides, 2005–2012, Next STL (Jan. 5,
2013), http://nextstl.com/2013/01/understanding-st-louis-homicides-2005-2012 [http://
perma.cc/9RMV-K7RY] (reporting “[o]f the 567 homicides from 2008 to 2011, for which
the race of the victim is available in the SLMPD annual reports, 502 are listed as black,
while 64 were white”).
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homicide epidemics. The evidence, then, points away from the
concurrent-epidemic explanation for a homicide spike in the past two
years.
D. Alternate Explanations for the 2015–2016 Trend
The concurrent-epidemic explanation for past homicide epidemics
has its critics: Some researchers have minimized the drug-epidemic
explanation and pointed to different drivers of the 1980s–1990s
homicide epidemic. Their work might provide alternate explanations for
the 2015–2016 trends. For example, Professors Philip Cook and John
Laub cite the convergence of larger birth cohorts with increased gun
availability to explain the spike in homicide in the previous era.159 This
explanation seems to comport with the contours of the current
epidemic, particularly in its concentration in cities and the elevated rates
of victimization among young Black and Latino males. Professors Cook
and Laub also note an increasing concentration in homicides among
minority males in the past epidemic, a generally downward age trend in
homicide offending, an increasing concentration of homicides in
structurally disadvantaged urban areas, and an increasing share of
homicides committed with guns.160 Again, these contours seem to reflect
the recent spike in homicides.
Several studies also cited increased gun availability as an explanation
for the previous epidemic.161 Professors Fagan, Franklin Zimring and
June Kim characterized the homicide epidemic from 1986 to 1995 as a
gun violence epidemic—rather than a homicide or violence epidemic—
that afflicted young minority males disproportionately.162 They showed
that from 1985 to 1996, nearly all the increase and decline in homicide,
159. Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence,
24 Crime & Just. 27, 29, 58–59 (1998) [hereinafter, Cook & Laub, Unprecedented
Epidemic] (noting negative correlation between youth population and rates of violent
crime). However, in a later article, Professors Cook and Laub outright reject the birth-
cohort explanation. Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, After the Epidemic: Recent Trends in
Youth Violence in the United States, 29 Crime & Just. 1, 23 (2002) [hereinafter Cook &
Laub, After the Epidemic] (rejecting cohort effects as an explanation for the epidemic
and noting contradictions in the drug–homicide nexus that mitigate but do not eliminate
its explanatory power).
160. See Cook & Laub, Unprecedented Epidemic, supra note 159, at 29 (connecting
the availability of guns with rates of violence among youths).
161. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Crime Is Not the Problem:
Lethal Violence in America 106–23 (1997) (discussing the role of guns in increasing death
from violence); see also Anthony A. Braga, Serious Youth Gun Offenders and the
Epidemic of Youth Violence in Boston, 19 J. Quantitative Criminology 33, 51–52 (2003)
(finding that in Boston “violence that was highly concentrated among serious youth
offenders who carried high capacity semiautomatic pistols and used their guns in an
increasingly deadly way”).
162. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin E. Zimring & June Kim, Declining Homicide in
New York City: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1277, 1289, 1291–96
(1998).
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assault, and other injury violence was the result of gun violence and that
non–gun violence rates remained unchanged.163 Professors Fagan and
Garth Davies showed a similar pattern of rising and falling gun violence
rates across neighborhoods from 1986 to 2000, characterizing some
neighborhoods as experiencing an acute contagious epidemic, while
others experienced rates that rose more slowly and declined more slowly,
in a pattern suggesting a “slow epidemic.”164 In the places with more
acute epidemic patterns, neighborhood social structure suggested an
ecological explanation for the differences in violence and injury epi-
demics across neighborhoods over time.165 Today, there are similar
patterns, with spatial concentration of homicides in cities including
Chicago166 and Milwaukee.167
Professor Alfred Blumstein cited increased firearm availability
nationally as a driver of the 1985–1993 homicide epidemic, linking
firearms with expanding drug-distribution networks that were centered
(though not exclusively) in street-gang conflicts.168 Others also focused
on street gangs to explain the urban concentration of homicide in that
era, but these studies also shifted attention from the gangs themselves to
social structural changes that were predictive of gang formation and
spread starting in the mid-1980s.169 Again, these factors are reflected in
the current patterns in Chicago but not necessarily in other cities (e.g.,
Baltimore, St. Louis) that also experienced recent homicide spikes.170 It
is important to remember that Chicago’s two-year increase is an outlier in
163. Id. at 1289–90.
164. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, The Natural History of Neighborhood Violence, 20
J. Contemp. Crim. Just. 127, 137–42 (2004); see also Jeffrey Fagan, Crime and
Neighborhood Change, in Nat’l Research Council, Understanding Crime Trends:
Workshop Report 81, 82–83 (Arthur S. Goldberger & Richard Rosenfeld eds., 2008)
(establishing a framework for understanding how “changing neighborhood contexts
influence crime”).
165. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 164, at 138 (finding “neighborhood ecology is a
significant predictor of total homicide, gun homicide, and homicides with African
American victims” and “[i]t is not surprising that neighborhood disadvantage predicts
homicide rates over time”).
166. Daniel Kay Hertz, The Debate over Crime Rates Is Ignoring the Metric that
Matters the Most: ‘Murder Inequality,’ Trace (July 25, 2016), http://www.thetrace.org/
2016/07/crime-rates-american-cities-murder-inequality/ [http://perma.cc/7HHW-NDR8]
(showing 2015 homicides by Chicago neighborhood).
167. Id. (showing 2015 homicides by Milwaukee neighborhood).
168. Blumstein, supra note 91, at 23–26.
169. See, e.g., S.E. Costanza & Ronald Helms, Street Gangs and Aggregate Homicides:
An Analysis of Effects During the 1990s Violent Crime Peak, 16 Homicide Stud. 280, 282
(2012) (establishing quantitative support for the assertion “that activities associated with
expanding markets in drugs and guns, at least some of which are facilitated through the
activities of local gangs, very likely contribute to aggregate patterns of lethal violence
across urban landscapes”).
170. See Ford Fessenden & Haeyoun Park, Chicago’s Murder Problem, N.Y. Times
(May 27, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2jR2kKO (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing the increasing role gangs and guns play in Chicago’s violence).
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its magnitude due to the size of the city: Figure 3 shows that Chicago did
experience an increase in homicides far greater than the nation’s two
other largest cities, but Figure 4 shows that several midsize cities also
experienced sharp homicide increases during the same period—
including increases in the per capita homicide rates—and that their
homicide rates exceeded Chicago’s during the same period.171 Yet
Chicago has gained political, media, and institutional notoriety when
other cities have not.172 Chicago accounted for 272 of the 606 “excess”
homicides in 2016 compared to 2015, or 44.8% of the homicide increases
in sixty-three of the nation’s largest cities.173 Excluding Chicago and
excluding the forty-nine deaths in the Pulse Night Club mass shooting in
Orlando, Florida,174 the increase across these sixty-three cities was
4.6%.175 This is a sizable increase but not the sort of systemic increase that
forecasts an epidemic.
E. The Danger of Predictions
The ingredients of the homicide spikes of the past fifty years are
either not present today or perhaps are less salient. We are in a period of
uncertainty as to what happens this year and beyond. Certainly, the scope
of major homicide increases, such as in Chicago, demands attention. But
so too do homicide spikes in several other large (e.g., Detroit) and
midsize (e.g., St. Louis, Baltimore, Milwaukee, Nashville) cities. The
increases in 2016—Chicago notwithstanding—were concentrated in
smaller cities, while homicides declined in several others. Figure 4 shows
that some cities with large homicide increases in 2015 experienced
homicide declines in 2016. Others stabilized. Whether these are random
walks in a new period of instability in homicide rates, temporary blips in
a longer historical trend of declining homicide rates, or harbingers of a
new homicide epidemic is impossible to say.176
171. Compare supra Figure 3, with supra Figure 4.
172. See, e.g., Andrew Blake, ATF Looks to Expand Federal Presence in Chicago Amid
Violent Crime Surge, Wash. Times (Feb. 4, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2017/feb/4/atf-looks-expand-federal-presence-chicago-amid-vio/?utm_campaign=
shareaholic&utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=socialnetwork [http://perma.cc/62JX-
9P6Y]; Monica Davey & Niraj Chokshi, Trump Threatens Federal Intervention in Chicago,
Citing ‘Carnage,’ N.Y. Times (Jan. 25, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2kqK3FG (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
173. See Major Cities Chiefs Ass’n, Violent Crime Survey—Totals: Year End
Comparison, January 1 to December 31, 2016 and 2015, at 1–2 (2017), http://www.
majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/news/violent_crime_data_20162015_year_end_report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Z42X-7YQE].
174. Ralph Ellis et al., Orlando Shooting: 49 Killed, Shooter Pledged ISIS Allegiance,
CNN (June 13, 2016), http://cnn.it/1XgEczk [http://perma.cc/M8BJ-4NKK].
175. See Major Cities Chiefs Ass’n, supra note 173, at 1–3.
176. See, e.g., David F. Greenberg, Time Series Analysis of Crime Rates, 17 J.
Quantitative Criminology 291, 300–301 (2001) (noting it “is unrealistic to suppose,
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Prediction is a risky business, and forecasting another homicide
epidemic would be unwise and unfounded. Professors Cook and Laub
conclude that the combination of volatility in violence rates and the
difficulty of testing counterfactuals for each of the overlapping plausible
explanations may require both long time horizons and complex research
designs to understand the ebb and flow of violence epidemics, the
differences across cities, the persons and neighborhoods affected, and
the variation in duration and intensity from one place to the next and
over different epochs.177 We may have a better idea of how epidemics
might launch, but those predictions are fraught with error. And once
started, there are even greater risks of error in predicting their duration
or severity. Figure 4 alone shows the number of momentary bumps in
homicide rates that might have appeared to be the start of a new
epidemic but that in fact were simply random perturbations in an overall
pattern of decline.
Mistakes can have disastrous consequences: Predictions in the mid-
1990s of a new epidemic of predatory violence by a new generation of
“superpredators”—even as violence declined after a decade-long
epidemic—were widely cited to justify significant and harsh changes in
the state and federal law,178 and led to profound but unnecessary changes
in law and policy regarding youth violence.179 Soon enough, the
however, that the same generating process responsible for temporal changes in crime will
continue unchanged forever”).
177. Cook & Laub, After the Epidemic, supra note 159, at 30–31 (making such
conclusions in the context of examining youth violence).
178. See, e.g., William J. Bennett, John J. Dilulio, Jr. & John P. Walters, Body Count 13–
14 (1996) (explaining in 1996 that Americans have become “desensitized” to crime and
that the dropping crime rates of the early 1990s might be “the lull before the coming
crime storm”); see also John J. Dilulio Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, Wkly.
Standard (Nov. 27, 1995), http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-coming-of-the-super-
predators/article/8160#! [http://perma.cc/M3L5-4QWC]. The “superpredator” myth
was translated into a forecast of the archetypical “symbolic assailant.” Jerome Skolnick
identified this archetype as a police trope for Black males based on his research with
police in the 1960s at the peak of one of the three homicide epidemics in the United
States. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in a Democratic
Society 45–48 (1966) (describing the “symbolic assailant” as “persons who use gesture,
language, and attire that the policeman has come to recognize as a prelude to violence”).
179. In 1995 alone, nearly half the states changed their laws to facilitate the criminal
prosecution of minors who were charged with any felony crime, including both violent
and property crimes. Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal System,
27 Crime & Just. 81, 84 (2000); Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth:
Why Infancy Is the Preadolescent’s Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 159,
178 & n.101 (2000); see also Cook & Laub, After the Epidemic, supra note 159, at 20
(“Explanations that attributed rising violence rates to the character of the youths . . .
proved influential with legislators, who in most states responded to the epidemic with
more punitive policies for juvenile crime.”); Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Crime and Criminal
Justice: Resolving Border Disputes, 18 Future Child. 81, 83 (2008) [hereinafter Fagan,
Border Disputes] (finding “evidence shows that policies promoting transfer of adolescents
from juvenile to criminal court” enacted in response to rising juvenile crime rates in the
1970s and 1980s “fail to deter crime among sanctioned juveniles and may even worsen
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sustained decline in homicide starting in the mid-1990s proved that
prediction to be tragically flawed, leaving a statutory legacy with the
perverse effect of increasing criminality among young offenders180 while
aggravating racial disparities.181
The risks of a false prediction stand in tension with the demands for
public safety: Police executives do not have the luxury of waiting to see
whether homicide spikes will end with a reversion to the mean. At risk on
both sides of this equation is the trust of communities in criminal legal
institutions, especially the police. And with trust comes legitimacy and
partnership with legal actors in the coproduction of security.182 Just as fair
and legal treatment promotes trust, so too does effective policing in
ensuring public safety. These are the immediate challenges for police,
public safety risks”). See generally Barry C. Feld, Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation
of the Juvenile Court (1999) (examining the evolution of juvenile courts and the
problematic shift toward rejecting the recognition of a need for separate kinds of
treatment of minors in the juvenile justice system); Franklin E. Zimring, American Youth
Violence: A Cautionary Tale, 42 Crime & Just. 265 (2013) (examining faulty assumptions
that caused exaggerated warnings of future surges in youth violence).
180. Fagan, Border Disputes, supra note 179, at 84 (examining failure of transfer
policies); Robert Hahn et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Effects on Violence
of Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer of Youth from the Juvenile to the Adult
Justice System: A Report on Recommendations of the Task Force on Community
Preventive Services, Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep.: Recommendations & Rep., Nov. 30,
2007, at 1, 9, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr5609.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q9Y2-
Y36V] (“To the extent that transfer policies are implemented to reduce violent or other
criminal behavior, available evidence indicates that they do more harm than good.”);
Lonn Lanza-Kaduce et al., Juvenile Offenders and Adult Felony Recidivism: The Impact of
Transfer, 28 J. Crime & Just. 59, 60 (2005) (“Contrary to the expectations of the
proponents of ‘get-tough’ policies, previous research generally found that transfer is
related to higher rather than lower rates of recidivism.”); Franklin E. Zimring & Stephen
Rushin, Did Changes in Juvenile Sanctions Reduce Juvenile Crime Rates? A Natural
Experiment, 11 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 57, 69 (2013) (producing statistical analysis revealing
“changes in juvenile homicide rates were highly similar to changes in young adult
homicide rates, despite the national wave of legislation targeted at juvenile offenders,”
which “undercuts” the causal claim between the decrease and such statutory changes).
181. See Feld, supra note 179, at 5 (noting “punitive juvenile justice policies impose
harsh sanctions disproportionately on minority youths and foster the growing procedural
and substantive convergence between juvenile and criminal courts”); Donna M. Bishop &
Charles E. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-Making: Findings of a
Statewide Analysis, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 392, 412 (1996) (“The quantitative
analyses demonstrate appreciable effects of race on delinquency case processing that
disadvantage minority offenders.”).
182. Tom Tyler & Yuen J. Ho, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Cooperation with the
Police and the Courts 65–67 (2002) (asserting “trust in particular individuals that develops
by virtue of their actions . . . lead[s] to inferences that the decisions of the authorities
should be accepted”); Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable
Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 751, 775
(2014) [hereinafter Tyler et al., Teachable Moments] (demonstrating “higher legitimacy is
related to lower levels of criminal behavior and also demonstrat[ing] that cooperation
with the police is greater when legitimacy is high”).
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communities, and government. We turn next to a framework and
principles to meet these challenges.
III. THE ECOLOGY OF POLICING, CYNICISM, AND VIOLENCE
Even as crime rates declined for two decades, tensions between
citizens and police rose, especially among African Americans183 and, to a
lesser extent, among Latinos.184 In the 1990s, at the outset of the
homicide and general crime decline, much of the distrust was focused on
racial profiling by police.185 Over time, minority citizens’ distrust of
police expanded to include police use of force186 and, later, everyday
policing of disorder.187 But as these tensions became more salient in
minority communities, police were less likely to see their use of force as
unjustified.188 Even as citizen distrust of police differed along racial lines,
183. Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race and Policing in America: Conflict and
Reform 70–88 (2006) (presenting evidence of perceptions of racially biased policing and
the impact on minority communities); Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste for
Punishment: Black and White Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty and the War on
Drugs, 1 Du Bois Rev. 151, 170 (2004) (noting changes in the criminal justice system have
taken a “heavily disproportionate toll on Black communities, especially low-income Black
communities”); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why Driving
While Black Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 269 (1999) (establishing the problem of
“driving while black”).
184. Mark Hugo Lopez & Gretchen Livingston, Pew Hispanic Research Ctr., Hispanics
and the Criminal Justice System: Low Confidence, High Exposure 1 (2009), http://www.
prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/pew_hispanic_center_hispanics_and_the_
criminal_justice_system_2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/4MUK-SP7C] (“At a time when
Latinos are interacting more than ever with police, courts and prisons, their confidence in
the U.S. criminal justice system is closer to the low levels expressed by blacks than to the
high levels expressed by whites.”).
185. See generally R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing and the Drug
War, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 571 (2003) (noting the existing “focus on racial profiling” and
arguing that “policy analyses should consider the race-related consequences of the drug
war, without regard to whether officers engage in racial profiling”); Harris, supra note 183,
at 277–88 (surveying the statistical analysis of racial distribution of traffic stops in New
Jersey, Maryland, and Ohio); Anthony Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and
the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 956, 956–59 (1999) (noting “[r]ecent studies
support” that “the police target people of color, particularly African Americans, for stops
and frisks”).
186. Steven A. Tuch & Ronald Weitzer, Racial Differences in Attitudes Toward Police,
61 Pub. Opinion Q. 642, 647 (1997) (showing stronger negative reactions by Blacks
compared to Whites in responses to highly publicized incidents of police use of force).
187. Kirk & Papachristos, supra note 84, at 1198 (noting in “socially and economically
disadvantaged neighborhoods, people come to understand that the [police] will offer
them little in the way of security, either economic or personal”); Tyler et al., Teachable
Moments, supra note 182, at 771 (noting “adverse effects of an increasing number of
police stops on perceptions of fairness and legality, both in terms of views about personal
experience and with general judgments about police behavior”).
188. David Weisburd et al., Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Police Attitudes Toward Abuse of
Authority: Findings from a National Study 5 (2000) http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
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there still was broad support for use of force in intimate police cultures
and subcultures.189 Today, that support is racialized within police
departments: White and Latino police officers tend to view fatal
encounters between Blacks and police as isolated incidents in contrast to
the views of a majority of Black officers.190
In the past decade, these tensions were exacerbated by highly
publicized police shootings of citizens—shootings that were often
captured on video and replayed on television and the Internet. Citizens
expressed deep anger over these incidents, often in political
demonstrations. Police pushed back politically to those demonstrations,
and there were signs of a police withdrawal in the face of criticism and
citizen anger.191 These exchanges only magnified the distrust between
citizens and police. These incidents tapped into Black citizens’
longstanding distrust of the police that was evident for well over a decade
before the current increase in homicides and remains acute today.192
Anger and distrust for police grew alongside not just incidents of police
violence toward citizens but police programs that encouraged
investigative stops and arrests and summonses for minor crimes and
violations—tactics that disproportionately affected Black and Latino
citizens.193
nij/181312.pdf [http://perma.cc/5W2U-QL7C]; see also Morin et al., supra note 23, at
75–76.
189. See, e.g., Anthony J. Micucci & Ian M. Gomme, American Police and Subcultural
Support for the Use of Excessive Force, 33 J. Crim. Just. 487, 489–90 (2005) (discussing
“informal standards” that “help to explain how and why police violence is extended from
its legitimate to its illegitimate use”).
190. Morin et al., supra note 23, at 16–17.
191. See supra section I.A.
192. See Malcolm D. Holmes & Brad W. Smith, Race and Police Brutality: Roots of an
Urban Dilemma 2–6 (2008) (citing research from the 1960s to the present on distrust of
the police among African Americans); Devon Johnson & Joseph B. Kuhns, Striking Out:
Race and Support for Police Use of Force, 26 Just. Q. 592, 597 (2009) (citing research
reporting race is strongest predictor of support for use of force and that Whites are more
likely to support use of force than Blacks); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of
Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 Law & Soc’y
Rev. 513, 515 (2003) (citing studies revealing minorities hold “much more negative
attitudes about the police” and “have lower trust and confidence in institutions of social
control”); Brian L. Thompson & James Daniel Lee, Jr., Who Cares if Police Become
Violent? Explaining Approval of Police Use of Force Using a National Sample, 74 Soc.
Inquiry 381, 383–84 (2004) (citing studies finding minorities “generally disapprove of
police violence” and “feel the criminal justice system is biased”); Ronald Weitzer & Steven
A. Tuch, Race and Perceptions of Police Misconduct, 51 Soc. Probs. 305, 305 (2004)
(“[R]ace is one of the most salient predictors of attitudes toward the police and other
criminal justice institutions: blacks are more likely than whites to express dissatisfaction
with various aspects of policing.”).
193. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Stops and Stares: Street Stops, Surveillance and Race in the
New Policing, 43 Fordham Urb. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 21–22) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the disproportionate racial impact of increased
investigative stops, searches, and arrests); see also Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares,
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The distrust today is a two-way street. Police regard protests of high-
visibility police shootings of citizens as motivated less by the perceived
injustice of those shootings and more by bias against police.194 Only
about one in three officers thinks protesters are sincerely motivated by a
desire to hold officers accountable.195 This may result in what this Essay
previously touched on—signs of a police pullback or withdrawal in the
face of citizen and political criticism, extensive video surveillance and
publicity of contested police actions, and even killings of police.196 In
other words, it could lead to de-policing. In Chicago, this was evident in
the form of sharply reduced Terry stops following the release of a police
video of the shooting of Laquan McDonald, an unarmed teenager who
was fleeing from police.197 In Baltimore, arrests for less-serious felonies
and misdemeanors declined substantially in the period between the
August 2014 demonstrations over the police killing of Michael Brown in
Ferguson, Missouri, and the April 2015 death of Freddie Gray in
Baltimore.198 At the same time, homicides in Baltimore increased sharply
during the police slowdown,199 but then declined in 2016 as arrests
resumed.200 While police officers describe a general withdrawal by police,
they offer few specifics as to their own or their colleagues’ actions.201
Clearly, there is evidence of a pullback in Chicago and Baltimore, but to
date, there is no support beyond anecdotes for claims of a general
withdrawal.202
Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority
Communities, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 173, 219–20 (2008) (describing the rise in order-
maintenance policing and its disproportionate effect on Black and Latino citizens); Tyler
et al., Teachable Moments, supra note 182, at 755–56 (discussing the rise of Terry stops and
“proactive policing” and identifying the practices’ disproportionate effect on minorities).
194. Morin et al., supra note 23, at 17–18 (finding 92% of police officers believe that
bias against the police is at least partially motivating these protests).
195. Id.
196. See supra Part I.
197. Kapustin et al., supra note 9, at 24 & n.24 (suggesting the video footage of the
police shooting of Laquan McDonald was partially responsible for an 80% decline in Terry
stops in Chicago).
198. Stephen L. Morgan & Joel A. Pally, Ferguson, Gray, and Davis: An Analysis of
Recorded Crime Incidents and Arrests in Baltimore City, March 2010 Through December
2015, at 48–49 (2016), http://socweb.soc.jhu.edu/faculty/morgan/papers/
MorganPally2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/NCQ4-QLDR].
199. Id. at 67.
200. Stephen L. Morgan, Fall 2016 Update for Ferguson, Gray, and Davis: An Analysis
of Recorded Crime Incidents and Arrests in Baltimore City, March 2010 through
December 2015 October 2016, at 1 (2016), http://socweb.soc.jhu.edu/faculty/
morgan/papers/MorganPally2016FallUpdate.pdf [http://perma.cc/5QUB-HTD6].
201. Morin et al., supra note 23, at 4. But see id. at 45 (finding more officers worry
about colleagues spending too much time diagnosing before acting on a situation).
202. See Mac Donald, supra note 79 (offering anecdotal evidence to support the
conclusion that “proactive policing is down”); Rosenfeld, supra note 79 at 18–23 (arguing
more empirical evidence is needed to analyze the legitimacy of a “Ferguson effect” that
has caused police to supposedly “disengage from their duties”).
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Although it is unclear whether any increase in the homicide rate can
be attributed to a police pullback, the pullback is part of a loosely
coupled system of distrust and resentment between citizens and police
that entwines violence, cynicism, and public safety into a complex and
tangled ecology. For us, the language of a “chill wind” adopted by FBI
Director Comey203 is meant to capture the connections in these
mechanisms and their consequences for urban homicide. We turn next
to how this tangled ecology plays out in the enduring homicide problems
of several U.S. cities.
A. Case Studies: Cynicism, Withdrawal, and the Persistence of Homicides
In several cities, people living in neighborhoods where homicide is a
recurring reality share a strikingly similar narrative about policing,
community, and murder. In this narrative, murders are not uncommon
but remain unsolved, citizens experience policing as detached from
serious crime and aimed at the wrong behaviors and the wrong people,
they see police as indifferent or disrespectful if not abusive, and they are
unwilling to cooperate in murder investigations by the police, whom they
view as an “occupation force.” These interlocking tensions reinforce the
social and economic isolation of places that already have the features of a
“poverty trap.”204 Residents feel not only unsafe but unfairly treated.
In this web of recurring social interactions, these perceptions—a
variety of police insults and recurring episodes of murder and other
violence––engender frustration and anger and, in turn, withdrawal from
cooperation with the police.205 Citizens see the police as indifferent to
their concerns, raising dignitarian issues that deepen the sense of
isolation and powerlessness before the police.206 And as we have noted,
criticisms of the police—who also feel isolated by very salient incidents of
203. See Comey, Remarks at University of Chicago, supra note 79 (describing a “chill
wind blowing through American law enforcement”).
204. See Bowels et al., supra note 83, at 3–5 (describing “poverty traps”).
205. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform & the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126
Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7–8) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(explaining the concept of “legal estrangement”); Matthew Desmond, Andrew V.
Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black
Community, 81 Am. Soc. Rev. 857, 858 (2016) [hereinafter Desmond et al., Police
Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting] (describing “legal cynicism” and the resulting
withdrawal from the police); David S. Kirk & Mauri Matsuda, Legal Cynicism, Collective
Efficacy, and the Ecology of Arrest, 49 Criminology 443, 444 (2011) (explaining “legal
cynicism” as a “cultural frame in which the law and the agents of its enforcement are
viewed as illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill equipped to ensure public safety”); Robert J.
Sampson & Dawn Jeglum Bartusch, Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of
Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences, 32 Law & Soc’y Rev. 777, 783
(1998) (“[I]nner-city contexts of racial segregation and concentrated disadvantage, where
inability to influence the structures of power that constrain lives is greatest, also breed
cynicism and perceptions of legal injustice.”).
206. I. Bennet Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 43, 68–69
(2009) (stating similar claims in terms of “public shaming”).
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police deaths—foster resentments that match the resentments of those
living in conditions of simultaneous over- and underpolicing.
1. Los Angeles. — In April 2016, L.A. police commanders deployed a
surge in South L.A. to counter an uptick in the homicide rate in the
area.207 Nearly half the violent gun crimes in the city take place in South
L.A., and the homicide rate had been rising citywide for the past three
years.208 Officers from the elite Los Angeles Police Department
Metropolitan Division flooded the area—a predominantly Black and
Latino part of the city—and intensified their stop activity to search for
weapons, scofflaws, or fugitives.209 They stopped drivers for infractions
such as tinted windows or broken taillights as a pretext to search for guns
or identify persons who were wanted on outstanding warrants.210 The
surge netted 300 illegal firearms in six months.211
While the homicide rate declined in South L.A. during the surge,
police tactics alienated Black residents. A 2016 survey conducted for the
Los Angeles Police Commission—after the homicide rate in South L.A.
had declined to the same levels as a year earlier—showed deep distrust
and anger toward the police among African American residents, leading
to a “‘profoundly serious disconnect’” between the LAPD and the city’s
Black citizens.212 Black respondents to the survey complained of repeated
stops, disrespect from police, and the types of “petty indignit[ies]” and
baseless police stops that the Terry court feared213 but whose pretextual
207. Cindy Chang, The LAPD’s Biggest Conundrum: How to Suppress Crime Without
Alienating South L.A.’s Black Residents, L.A. Times (Feb. 4, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-lapd-crime-trust-20170203-story.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Chang, Biggest Conundrum].
208. See id.; see also supra Figures 3, 4.
209. Chang, Biggest Conundrum, supra note 207; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Elliott Ash,
New Policing, New Segregation: From Ferguson to New York, 105 Geo. L.J. Online 16
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 4–5) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing “broken windows” strategy); Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73
Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 2010, at 107, 108–10 (discussing police dragnets).
210. Chang, Biggest Conundrum, supra note 207.
211. Id.; see also Cindy Chang, LAPD Reassigns Elite Cops After Killings Fall in South
L.A. but Crime Jumps in Other Parts of L.A., L.A. Times (Oct. 1, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lapd-crime-redeploy-20161001-snap-
story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the results of the surge).
212. Kate Mather & Cindy Chang, LAPD Watchdog Takes a Long Look into
Allegations of Racial Profiling, L.A. Times (Nov. 15, 2016), http://fw.to/WjQB4oY (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
213. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968); see also Bell, supra note 205, at 56–
57 (noting “police cases more than others send messages about social inclusion” and that
programs like the systematic stop-and-frisks at issue in Terry can result in “legal
estrangement”); Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the
Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 Stan. L. Rev. 987, 1008 (2014) (noting
the Terry Court’s fear that many frisks are “wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime”
(alteration in original) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 13)); Capers, supra note 206, at 64
(noting Terry’s implicit acknowledgement of the disproportionate impact of its decision on
disadvantaged communities); William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 St. John’s L. Rev.
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basis the Court sanctioned in United States v. Whren.214
The other source of alienation and cynicism of the residents in
South L.A. was the inability of police to “clear” a homicide, that is, to
make an arrest in that case.215 Clearance rates in L.A. citywide were below
the national average of 62.5% for the period 2009 to 2012 and averaged
38% for the period from 1994 to 2006.216 Current data show that
homicide clearance rates improved from 60.2% in 2012 to 68.1% in
2015.217 Still, homicide clearance rates vary by police district and seem to
have remained stubbornly low for South L.A. for over two decades.218
Residents there interpreted the low clearance rate as indifference to
Black homicides, one part of the L.A. Black community’s belief that
police favor White crime victims.219
1213, 1218 (1998) (describing four distinct harms—privacy harm, targeting harm,
discrimination, and physical harm—suffered by victims of unreasonable police stops). The
reactions of Blacks in South L.A. to being stopped mirrors the sense of racial targeting
that Professor Bennett Capers discusses in his research into race-based public shaming.
See Capers, supra note 206, at 68–69.
214. See Chang, Biggest Conundrum, supra note 207; see also Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) (noting the Supreme Court has “never held, outside of inventory
search or administrative inspection . . . that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively
justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment”).
215. See Jill Leovy, Ghettoside: A True Story of Murder in America 48–49 (2015)
(discussing clearance rates in L.A. County and South L.A.).
216. See Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Crimes and Clearance, OpenJustice,
http://openjustice.doj.ca.gov/crime-statistics/crimes-clearances (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (providing data for clearance rates in L.A. County
through 2015).
217. Id. The most recent data are from 2015. Id.; see also L.A. Police Comm’n,
Investigation of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Homicide Clearance Rates 4 (2015),
http://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/072115/BPC_15-0214.pdf [http://perma.cc/5UFT-
4J38].
218. See Chang, Biggest Conundrum, supra note 207; see also Leovy, supra note 215,
at 48–49; Tammy Rinehart Kochel, Applying Police Legitimacy, Cooperation, and
Collective Security Hypotheses to Explain Collective Efficacy and Violence Across
Neighborhoods, Int’l J. Comp. & Applied Crim. Just., 2017, at 1, 14 (finding that police
competence in maintaining public safety in neighborhoods encourages citizens to
cooperate with police and engage in their own efforts independent of police to “co-
produce social order”); Nicholas Peterson, Neighborhood Context and Unsolved
Murders: The Social Ecology of Homicide Investigations, 27 Policing & Society 372, 383
(2015) (showing that, for all homicides in Los Angeles between 1990 and 1994, the odds
of clearing a homicide decline by 50% for each 1% increase in the Black population of a
neighborhood, and decline by 31% for each 1% increase in the Latino population of a
neighborhood).
219. See Mather & Chang, supra note 212 (describing stark racial disparities in L.A.
residents’ perceptions of the police force’s trustworthiness). The distrust and anger of
citizens in Los Angeles toward the police has deepened even further this year. In a 2017
survey by Loyola Marymount University, researchers reported that nearly 7 out of 10
respondents between ages eighteen and twenty-nine predict that a repeat of the 1992
Rodney King riots will happen within the next five years, an increase of 33% from the 2012
survey. Fernando Guerra, Brianne Gilbert & Berto Solis, LA Riots 25 Years Later: 2017 Los
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The low homicide clearance rate “left killers at large and families of
murder victims without answers.”220 In this setting, a dragnet of intrusive
stops—simply harassment to many residents of South L.A.221—produced
little offset in justice and led to alienation and cynicism that, along with
fear of retribution from local crime groups and offenders, deterred
residents in the neighborhood from helping police to solve murders.222
Furthermore, more experienced and capable detectives sought out
“better” assignments in wealthier neighborhoods, avoiding the Black
neighborhoods most in need, which compounded and reinforced the
dynamics of unsolved murders and cynicism among local residents.223
2. New York City. — New York City has become a safe city. In 2016,
the number of shootings dropped by 12% to 998; this was the first time
that shootings fell below 1,000 since shooting data were compiled.224
Murders dropped from 352 to 335 in the same period, reversing a one-
year increase in 2015. Overall, the total crime rate dropped by 4%, with a
yearly reduction in almost every major category of crime, including
major felonies.225 This downward trend continues a decline that began in
1992 and has continued nearly uninterrupted for twenty-five years.226
Still, crime rose by 2.4% in the NYPD Housing Bureau,227 which is
significant because it is mainly in the city’s housing projects that a
complex ecology of policing, poverty, cynicism, and violence churns.228
Angeles Public Opinion Survey Report 3 (2017), http://lmu.app.box.com/s/
it0e448kjmhz2jg1s39eht0g8ye63yhr (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
220. Mike Reicher, LAPD Closed Homicide Cases Without Bringing Killers to Justice,
Analysis Shows, L.A. Daily News (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.dailynews.com/general-
news/20150124/lapd-closed-homicide-cases-without-bringing-killers-to-justice-analysis-
shows [http://perma.cc/PW7F-AAD5].
221. See Chang, Biggest Conundrum, supra note 207 (depicting South L.A. residents’
perception of police stops as harassment).
222. See Leovy, supra note 215, at 74–86 (discussing reluctance of witnesses to testify
and witness intimidation).
223. Id. at 26.
224. Jen Kirby, New York City Had a Record-Low Crime Rate in 2016—But that’s Not
the Story in Other Cities, N.Y. Mag. (Jan. 4, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2017/01/new-york-city-had-record-low-crime-rate-in-2016.html [http://
perma.cc/HRW7-FNGB].
225. NYC Crime Falls to Lowest Levels in Decades: NYPD, NBC N.Y. (Jan. 4, 2017),
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/NYC-Crime-Falls-to-Lowest-Levels-in-Decades-
NYPD-409660785.html [http://perma.cc/JW4Q-P7K4] (quoting NYPD statistics).
226. Franklin E. Zimring, The City that Became Safe: New York’s Lessons for Urban
Crime and Its Control 5–7 (2012); see also supra Figures 3, 4.
227. NYC Crime Falls to Lowest Levels in Decades: NYPD, supra note 225. The
Housing Bureau is the division of the New York City Police Department that patrols New
York City Public Housing Authority developments. See Housing Bureau, NYPD,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/housing_bureau/housing.shtml
[http://perma.cc/7EK7-V6QD] (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
228. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Crime in Public Housing: Clarifying Research Issues, Nat’l
Inst. Just. J., Mar. 1998, at 2, 2–3, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/jr000235.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KF94-3NLR] (noting much contemporary public housing today
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As in L.A., the highest homicide area in New York City, the South
Bronx, has had the fewest detectives assigned per violent crime.229 The
underpolicing in this police precinct is common to the rest of the Bronx,
an area with a population of 1,455,444 in 2015230 and the city’s highest
per capita murder rate.231 Journalists covering the Bronx quote citizens’
reports that their crime complaints are ignored by the police, their 911
calls are unanswered for hours, and some 911 calls end up with an arrest
of the caller. Those arrests in turn can lead to detention for hours in a
“fetid holding cell” in a police precinct for a minor offense.232
At the same time, aggressive policing tactics—stops and frisks,
misdemeanor arrests, and summons activities—that characterized the
NYPD’s policing model for over two decades have been intensively
applied in the Bronx, particularly in the special “Impact Zones” that
include public housing developments.233 Courts have cited constitutional
problems in those practices, ordered remedies, and awarded damages.234
“suffers from poor design, deteriorating structures, inadequate funding, a large
concentration of poor people, isolation from social services, high crime rates, and
cumbersome management”); Adam Carlis, Note, The Illegality of Vertical Patrols, 109
Colum. L. Rev. 2002, 2002–03 (2009) (noting an “intractable fear of the projects” has led
to aggressive policing strategies within those communities).
229. Benjamin Mueller & Al Baker, Rift Between Officers and Residents as Killings
Persist in South Bronx, N.Y. Times (Dec. 31, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2jVye66 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Mueller & Baker, Rift Between Officers and
Residents]. Among the NYPD’s seventy-seven precincts, nine of the fourteen lowest-staffed
detective squads are in the Bronx. Id.
230. Quick Facts, U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts, http://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/table/PST045216/36005,36 [http://perma.cc/D9B2-W85T] (last visited Feb.
11, 2017).
231. See Major Crime in New York City, 2009–2015, Newsday, http://data.newsday.
com/long-island/data/crime/new-york-city-crime-rate/ [http://perma.cc/NA9K-3F4J]
(last updated Aug. 31, 2016). Although there were fifty-five more murders in Brooklyn
(Kings County) in 2015 (146) than in the Bronx (91), id., the population in Brooklyn is
2,636,735, nearly twice that of the Bronx. See Kings County, NY, Census Rep.,
http://censusreporter.org/profiles/05000US36047-kings-county-ny/ [http://perma.cc/
MPH9-YACL] (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
232. Mueller & Baker, Rift Between Officers and Residents, supra note 229.
233. See John MacDonald, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, The Effects of Local Police
Surges on Crime and Arrests in New York City, PLOS One 1–3 (2016), http://journals.
plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0157223&type=printable [http://
perma.cc/UF7U-Y8TD]; see also Fagan & Davies, supra note 164, at 142 (warning that
focusing on specific neighborhoods may “mask potentially important cultural dynamics
from the broader social environment that bear on the natural history of violence”); Carlis,
supra note 228, at 2009–11 (describing how “finding an area to be ‘high crime’” is used to
justify more aggressive policing tactics).
234. New York City recently agreed to terminate the practice of vertical patrols and
trespass abatement in both public housing and subsidized housing, stipulating to Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment violations in this practice. See Stinson v. City of New York,
282 F.R.D. 360, 383–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting class certification for a § 1983 claim
against the city and police officers for unconstitutional summonses); Stipulation of
Settlement and Order at 7–11, Ligon v. City of New York, 12 Civ. 2274 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
2, 2017), http://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/ligon_settlement.pdf
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The courts have found that few of those sanctions—stops, arrests,
summonses—result in convictions or enforced summonses, as noted in
the settlement in several of those lawsuits.235 Those that lead to
arraignment often take years to resolve and burden defendants with
repeated court appearances, lost days of work, childcare complications,
days in detention, and a minor criminal record.236 The South Bronx
precinct, known as the 4-0 (the 40th precinct), had the second-highest
number of civilian complaints for officer misconduct (verbal abuse,
physical abuse, and inaction in the face of citizen crime reports) in
2016.237 The Bronx also has the five precincts with the highest number of
personal injury court claims alleging police misconduct adjusted for the
local crime rate.238
A troubled court system that compounds the harms of petty police
enforcement, underpolicing of murder and violent crime, perceived
injustices of overpolicing of minor crimes with only tenuous connections
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Ligon Stipulation] (describing parties’
mutual agreement that enforcement of New York City’s trespass law must conform with
constitutional principles); Settlement Stipulation of Settlement at 6–9, Davis v. City of New
York, 10 Civ. 0699 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/files/case_
issue/Davis%20v.%20City%20of%20New%20York-Stipulation%20of%20Settlement.pdf
[http://perma/cc/2CP3-STNC] (agreeing to changes in the NYPD’s trespass enforcement
policies in New York City public housing); see also Floyd I, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658–67
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding New York City liable for violating plaintiffs’ Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights with the stop-and-frisk policy). New York City agreed to
settle the Stinson case and pay $75 million to plaintiffs. Benjamin Weiser, New York City to
Pay Up to $75 Million over Dismissed Summonses, N.Y. Times (Jan. 23, 2017),
http://nyti.ms/2jR44V5 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing settlement for
over 900,000 summonses, issued primarily in minority communities, found to be without
legal justification).
235. See Floyd v. City of New York (Floyd II), 959 F. Supp. 2d 691, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(recognizing need for court monitoring of summonses); Stinson, 282 F.R.D. at 383–84
(upholding certification of a § 1983 class action alleging a policy of facially invalid
summonses); Ligon Stipulation, supra note 234, at 7–11 (describing how the NYPD will
change its enforcement policies in and around buildings in the Trespass Affidavit
Program); see also Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66
Stan. L. Rev. 611, 690–91 (2014) (explaining the “transition from nonconviction
dispositions to convictions, for the overwhelming majority of misdemeanor cases, [is]
largely a factor of the temporal proximity of arrests” and “likelihood of arrest is a function
of not only an individual’s conduct, but also of policing practices”).
236. William Glaberson, Faltering Courts, Mired in Delays, N.Y. Times (Apr. 13, 2013),
http://nyti.ms/ZmOE6s (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
237. See Complaint Activity Map, N.Y.C. Civilian Complaint Review
Bd., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/policy/complaint-activity-
map.page [http://perma.cc/56PQ-G8SU] (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) (displaying an
interactive map showing 111 complaints received from the 40th precinct in 2016).
238. See Office of the N.Y.C. Comptroller, CLAIMSTAT: Protecting Citizens and Saving
Taxpayer Dollars 2 (2014), http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/
ClaimStat.pdf [http://perma.cc/92RF-MS55]; Marc G. Peters & Philip K. Eure, N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Investigations, Using Data from Lawsuits and Legal Claims Involving NYPD to
Improve Policing 2 (2015), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/oignypd/downloads/pdf/2015-
04-20-litigation-data-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/MX9J-PGJP].
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to major crimes, and perceived harassment and fear of violence has bred
cynicism toward police, which leads Bronx citizens to withdraw from
cooperation with police to solve crimes.239 As in L.A., citizens fear
retribution if they cooperate with police, and police are unable to
provide protection to break that particular chain; residents actively
intervene to discourage others from reporting crimes or cooperating
with the police.240 They carry the resentments of the policing model as a
negative incentive—multiplied by fear of retaliation—and choose not to
help the police. For example, when a young Black mother was killed by a
stray bullet in 2016, Bronx detectives had no responses to a reward of
$2,500 posted for tips, a fraction of the reward offered for leads in the
killing of a White jogger in a Queens precinct earlier in the year.241
In New York City, as in L.A., perceived police injustices and
indifference, persistent and unresolved cases of violence, and residents’
cynicism and withdrawal are all implicated in the neighborhoods where
murder persists even as the rest of the two cities become safer. This is not
to say that the persistence of violent and drug crimes, often carried out
by local gangs tied to specific housing developments, are not part of that
ecology.242 But the disconnect between citizens and police removes what
might otherwise be a social process to undo the cycle.
There are signs of progress. To its credit—perhaps spurred into
action by a New York Times series highlighting the inadequacy of
investigative resources in the South Bronx—the NYPD recently
announced plans to substantially reinforce the ranks of homicide
investigators there.243
3. Chicago. — The homicide spike in Chicago since 2014—
unprecedented in the city’s last half century244—has coincided with
revelations of serious institutional problems with the police department.
239. Mueller & Baker, Rift Between Officers and Residents, supra note 229 (noting
“[d]etectives’ phones barely ring with tips”).
240. Id. (detailing how fear of retribution stops citizens from reporting serious
crimes).
241. Benjamin Mueller & Al Baker, A Mother Is Shot Dead on a Playground, and a Sea
of Witnesses Goes Silent, N.Y. Times (Oct. 7, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2k82BWG (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Mueller & Baker, Mother Shot Dead].
242. Beth Kormanik, Threat from Gangs Heightens Anxiety in a Brooklyn
Neighborhood, N.Y. Times, (Jan. 20, 2012), http://nyti.ms/2m6bzJJ (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing gang issues in a Brooklyn neighborhood and
relationship to crime); Mueller & Baker, Mother Shot Dead, supra note 241 (describing
the murder of Jessica White as a terrible byproduct of a dispute between two drug dealers
in her public housing development).
243. See Benjamin Mueller & Al Baker, Police to Strengthen Force in New York’s Most
Violent Borough, N.Y. Times (Feb. 8, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2kQztI2 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting the NYPD “plans to send 75 new investigators to the Bronx
to address a steep and longstanding shortage of detectives in the department’s most
violent and underserved borough”).
244. See supra Figures 3 & 4.
2017] UNDERSTANDING RECENT SPIKES 1285
Both a citizen task force in Chicago and the DOJ CRD’s recent
investigations of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) revealed systemic
problems of excessive force, deadly force, inadequate systems of
accountability, unlawful detentions, and the absence of transparency in
disciplinary practices for officer misconduct. As in New York and L.A.,
important commands in the city were understaffed. The two reports also
note low morale among officers, complaints about insufficient training
and support, and sharp criticism by the public.245 In addition to the
Labor Day refusal-to-work incident,246 there are indicators of a pullback
in proactive enforcement—street stops—by CPD officers in Chicago’s
highest-crime neighborhoods.247 A recent report by the Crime Lab at the
University of Chicago showed an 80% drop in street stops (including
investigative stops and Terry stops), from 50,000 stops per month to
10,000 stops per month, in the period from November 2015 to January
2016.248
The drop in stops preceded the sharp spike in homicides in Chicago
by two months. Factors proposed for the cause of the decrease in stops
included: the outcry by community and political leaders following the
release of the video of the shooting of Laquan McDonald;249 the city’s
agreement with the ACLU of Northern Illinois requiring documentation
of each stop;250 and a new state law, SB 1304, requiring police officers to
issue a receipt to each person they stop.251 Although Chicago
245. Police Accountability Task Force, supra note 10, at 6–13 (describing findings);
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the Chicago Police Department, supra note 10, at 7–
12 (summarizing the prevalence of these problems in the investigation into Chicago’s
police practices).
246. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Arthur & Asher, supra note 10 (claiming new measures making
paperwork more burdensome discourage police from engaging in “proactive policing”);
Bryan, supra note 10 (noting that police are more cautious after the national outrage);
Byrne, supra note 10 (noting Mayor Rahm Emanuel believes that Chicago police officers
are more hesitant to engage in assertive patrol practices after the release of the video of
Laquan McDonald shooting incidents).
248. Kapustin et al., supra note 9, at 24.
249. See Mark Konkol, Kelly Bauer & Tanveer Ali, Laquan McDonald Video Shows
Police Shooting Him 16 Times, DNA Info (Nov. 24, 2015, 4:18 PM), http://www.dnainfo.
com/chicago/20151124/archer-heights/laquan-mcdonald-video-shows-police-shooting-
him-16-times [http://perma.cc/3LF6-MGW4]; see also Oppel, Plan Under Fire, supra
note 1 (describing the Mayor’s plan in response to increased violence after the release of
the video of Laquan McDonald’s death).
250. See Jeremy Gorner, ACLU, Chicago Police Agree to Changes on Controversial
Street Stops, Chi. Trib. (Aug. 7, 2015, 6:01 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-
chicago-police-aclu-street-stops-met-20150807-story.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
251. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/107-14 (West 2016); see also Police Reform Bill Passes
the Illinois General Assembly, Cmty. Renewal Soc’y (June 3, 2015), http://www.
communityrenewalsociety.org/police-reform-bill-passes-illinois-general-assembly [http://
perma.cc/2SPD-2KR7] (interpreting the bill). In addition to requiring officers to issue
receipts after street stops, SB 1304 set guidelines for body-worn cameras, required the
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experienced a sharp decline in stops before its homicide spike,
homicides in New York City did not increase following a similar decline
in stops from 2012 through 2015. In fact, homicides there continued to
decline in 2016 after a small uptick in 2015.252 Perhaps there is some
optimal number of stops in each city, but calculating that figure is indeed
a challenge.
Chicago, then, seems to follow the same pattern as New York City’s
South Bronx neighborhood and South L.A.: Citizens who witness shoot-
ings and murders refuse to cooperate with police.253 Citizen trust in the
police is low, and it is lowest in the South and West Side neighbor-
hoods—places that are both the most heavily policed and the most in
need of police protection and criminal investigations.254 At the same time
that homicides go unsolved, citizens arrested for petty offenses spend
long periods in jail awaiting court dates and then plead guilty to
misdemeanors that lead to spells on probation, creating an even deeper
wedge between citizens and police.255 This distrust breeds further
violence by breaking the already threadbare ties between citizens and
police, which then puts both citizens and police at some risk. Through
dozens of interviews with adolescents and young adults on the West Side,
Professor Craig Futterman and his colleagues captured the cycle of
violence and distrust:
It is not often enough noted that law enforcement itself is
among the major casualties of the lack of police
accountability . . . . Distrust of the police sets in motion a cycle
with devastating effects for our children’s safety, sometimes with
grave consequences. Because kids do not trust police, they will
not call the police when they’re in trouble. Because people will
not cooperate with the police, the police cannot solve and
prevent crimes. Because the police cannot solve and prevent
crimes, residents are yet less likely to go to the police and more
likely to look for resolution or restitution outside the law. In the
absence of meaningful accountability, the cycle goes on and on,
creation of a database for police officer professional conduct, mandated independent
investigations of officer-involved deaths, prohibited chokeholds, and implemented several
other reforms to strengthen investigations and oversight of CPD. See Police Reform Bill
Passes the Illinois General Assembly, supra.
252. Kirby, supra note 224 (noting New York City’s unique declining crime rate); NYC
Crime Falls to Lowest Levels in Decades: NYPD, supra note 225.
253. Monica Davey, In Chicago, Bodies Pile Up at an Intersection of ‘Depression and
Rage,’ N.Y. Times (Dec. 9, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2k4UY3U (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (detailing uncooperative witnesses after a major shooting).
254. Monica Davey & Giovanni Russonello, In Deeply Divided Chicago, Most Agree:
City Is Off Course, N.Y. Times (May 6, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2kV84of (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
255. See Shaila Dewan & Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the Price of a Second
Chance, N.Y. Times (Dec. 12, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2mdUJF4 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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reducing urban neighborhoods to something akin to failed
states.256
Much of the violence in in these neighborhoods is common and
deadly, often stemming from gang conflicts.257 Yet there are few exits
from gang life and little incentive to exit even when one is available.258
Interpersonal disputes are often the spark for gang violence and
killings.259 But gangs in Chicago also are complex organizations and
heterogeneous in their makeup, with unemployed drug dealers and
working men in the same groups.260 Income from drug sales is central to
the economic lives of some in the gang, though certainly not for all.261
While similar disputes and conflicts between local drug-dealing groups
often spark murders in New York City,262 gangs there are more
concentrated in public housing developments,263 while in Chicago, gangs
spread across the South and West Sides. Accordingly, there are fewer
256. Craig Futterman et al., “They Have All the Power”: Youth/Police Encounters on
Chicago’s South Side 23 (Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 573,
2016), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2022&context=
public_law_and_legal_theory (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
257. Ben Green, Thibaut Horel & Andrew V. Papachristos, Modeling Contagion
Through Social Networks to Explain and Predict Gunshot Violence in Chicago, 2006 to
2014, 177 JAMA Internal Med. at e1, e4 (2017), http://jamanetwork.com/journals/
jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2594804 [http://perma.cc/26BH-3HH9] (showing that
52.3% of the subjects of gun violence in Chicago between 2006 and 2013 were gang
members, increasing the penetration of gang members into violence networks and
creating a contagion vector of gangs).
258. See Andrew V. Papachristos, Murder by Structure: Dominance Relations and the
Social Structure of Gang Homicide, 115 Am. J Soc. 74, 75 (2009) [hereinafter
Papachristos, Murder by Structure] (describing the prevalence and causes of gang
violence in impoverished Chicago neighborhoods); see also John Eligon, Bored, Broke
and Armed: Clues to Chicago’s Gang Violence, N.Y. Times (Dec. 22, 2016),
http://nyti.ms/2jHCKsf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
259. See Papachristos, Murder by Structure, supra note 258, at 75–76 (arguing
individual killings spark contagion-like spread due to norms of reciprocity); Eligon, supra
note 258 (describing how gang members sometimes lash out in inexplicable bursts of
violence over non-gang-related issues, such as disputes for attention).
260. See Eligon, supra note 258.
261. See id.; see also Paul E. Bellair & Thomas L. McNulty, Gang Membership, Drug
Selling, and Violence in Neighborhood Context, 26 Just. Q. 644, 649 (2009) (describing
economic and social incentives in disadvantaged neighborhoods of seeking gang
membership and selling drugs); Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alldi Venkatesh, An Economic
Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang’s Finances, 115 Q.J. Econ. 755, 755–56 (2000) (reviewing
literature and providing an economic analysis of the nature and causes of drug selling by
gangs).
262. Mueller & Baker, Mother Shot Dead, supra note 241; Benjamin Weiser, Sweep in
Bronx Tackles Decades of Gang Chaos, N.Y. Times (Apr. 27, 2016), http://nyti.ms/
2ky1OTc (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
263. Kormanik, supra note 242.
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gang conflicts in New York City simply by virtue of the smaller number of
gangs.264
One other factor likely driving Chicago’s spike in homicides is guns.
Chicago’s gun homicide rate in 2016 was 25.1 per 100,000 persons,
nearly twice the rate of 14.7 in Philadelphia, the next-highest large city
measured.265 At the same time, its non-gun homicide rate of 2.7 per
100,000 persons was comparable to the rates in Houston and
Philadelphia, among the other largest cities in the United States.266 Gun
availability in Chicago, as evidenced by gun seizures, is very high:
Approximately 8,300 guns were seized in 2016.267 This is an increase of
more than 30% from the 6,521 illegal guns seized by mid-December of
the previous year and far above the 6,815 and 6,429 guns seized in 2013
and 2014, respectively.268 One gun per hour was seized in Chicago in the
first six months of 2016; 100 guns were seized on Father’s Day weekend
alone.269 Most of the guns were seized in the South and West Sides, the
areas of the city with the highest homicide rates. The volume of these
seizures is startling in light of the pullback in policing and in Terry stops
in Chicago—which has occurred even as the CPD has highlighted the
connection between gun availability and murder.270
Most of Chicago’s increase in homicides was in gun homicides,
which rose from 261 in 2015 to 687 in 2016.271 While gang disputes are a
major source of gun homicides, gun robberies accounted for the major
increase in robberies in 2016.272 Chicago, in other words, like New York
City in the 1980s, suffers not only from concentrated poverty and legal
264. Benjamin Mueller & Al Baker, Drop in Gang Violence Drove New York Shootings
Below 1,000 in 2016, N.Y. Times (Jan. 3, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2kqPAZ1 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
265. Kapustin et al., supra note 9, at 9.
266. Id. Only New York City and L.A. had lower non-gun homicide rates among the
five largest U.S. cities. Id.
267. 2016 Chicago: 762 Murders, 3,500 Shootings, 8,300 Guns Confiscated, WOWT
News (Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.wowt.com/content/news/2016-Chicago-762-murders-
more-than-3500-shootings–409173925.html [http://perma.cc/C2SK-JE39].
268. Sarah Kollmorgen, Chicago Criminals’ Favorite Gunmakers: A Visual Ranking,
Trace (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.thetrace.org/2016/01/chicago-crime-guns-chart/
[http://perma.cc/U2JX-3MBM].
269. Chicago Cops Have Seized a Gun per Hour This Year, CBS Chi. (June 21, 2016),
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2016/06/21/chicago-cops-have-seized-a-gun-per-hour-this-
year/ [http://perma.cc/Q8BM-YHEL].
270. Office of the Mayor, City of Chi. & Chi. Police Dep’t, Tracing the Guns: The
Impact of Illegal Guns on Violence in Chicago 7 (2014), http://www.cityofchicago.org/
dam/city/depts/mayor/PressRoom/PressReleases/2014/May/05.27.14TracingGuns.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5MMW-UY3N].
271. Kapustin et al., supra note 9, at 9–10.
272. Id.
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cynicism among both citizens and police but also from a gun violence
epidemic.273
Figure 5 shows the density of Federal Firearm Licensees and gun
manufacturers within twenty miles of the Chicago city border as of
January, 2016, about one year after the onset of the rise in Chicago gun
homicides in 2015. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF) issues firearms licenses (FFLs) to regulate the
distribution and manufacture of firearms.274 Figure 5 shows that there
were dozens of FFL licensees selling firearms within that perimeter,
including several on the city border adjacent to the South and West Side
areas where homicides are concentrated. Another cluster of dealers is
concentrated within a few miles of the Indiana state line on Chicago’s
southern boundary.
Whether Chicago’s crime guns are entering the city from these
sources cannot be fully determined from DOJ gun trace data, since only
a portion of crime guns are recovered and submitted for trace. But based
on what is known, signs do point to crime guns entering the city from
those dealers. One dealer, located near the southeast side of the city, sold
over 1,500 crime guns in a five-year period from 2009 to 2013.275 Four
nearby dealers accounted for 20% of the recovered crime guns in
Chicago during this period.276 Together, dealers in Illinois and
neighboring Indiana accounted for 11,874 recovered crime guns during
this period, nearly 60% of the total.277 If Chicago is suffering from a gun
homicide epidemic, these sources—arrayed in a pattern that may not be
unique to Chicago278—might be thought of as one of the “pumps” that is
infecting the neighborhoods with the instruments of murder.
273. Bourgois, supra note 125, at 115–19 (showing cynicism among drug dealers
toward law and legal work from the 1980s into the early 1990s); Fagan, Zimring & Kim,
supra note 162, at 1289–90 (detailing an epidemic in New York City that was exclusively
guns); Paul Jargowsky, Ghetto Poverty Among Blacks in the 1980s, 13 J. Pol’y Analysis &
Mgmt. 288, 288–305 (1994) (discussing concentrated poverty in major cities including
Chicago and New York City in the 1980s).
274. See Firearms, ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,
http://www.atf.gov/firearms [http://perma.cc/S2FR-QC9D] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
The Bureau also conducts firearms licensee qualifications and compliance inspections.
275. Office of the Mayor, City of Chi. & Chi. Police Dep’t, supra note 270, at 7.
276. Id. at 6.
277. See id. at 5 (showing 8,050 guns recovered in this period originally sold in Illinois
and 3,824 guns originally sold in Indiana, totaling 11,874).
278. Gun Sellers in the United States, OREGONLIVE: The Oregonian, http://
projects.oregonlive.com/guns/dealers [http://perma.cc/RTH5-USQZ] (last visited Apr.
19, 2016) (providing an interactive map displaying gun dealerships by county across the
United States).
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FIGURE 5: CHICAGO AREA GUN DEALERS, JANUARY 2016279
In Chicago, the gun supply interacted with the social and economic
contexts of the South and West Sides to animate the homicide epidemic
of these past two years. Wherever the guns are sold, they seem to land in
279. This graph was creating using ATF’s data for FFL holders in Indiana and Illinois
for January 2016. See Downloadable Lists of Federal Firearm Licensees (FFLs), ATF:
Bureau of Alochol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, http://www.atf.gov/firearms/
listing-federal-firearms-licensees-ffls-2016 [http://perma.cc/NPR9-SEFL] (last updated
Jan. 30, 2017) (data on file with the Columbia Law Review). The addresses were geocoded
using World Geocoding Service through ArcGIS Mapping with ArcMap. See ArcGIS, ESRI,
http://www.arcgis.com/
home/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2017). Map boundaries for Chicago were
downloaded from the City of Chicago. See City of Chicago, Data Portal: Boundaries - City,
http://data.cityofchicago.org/Facilities-Geographic-Boundaries/Boundaries-City/ewy2-
6yfk (data on file with the Columbia Law Review). Illinois boundary maps (shape files) were
obtained from Illinois State Boundary, Illinois Geospatial Data Clearinghouse
http://clearinghouse.isgs.illinois.edu/data/reference/illinois-state-boundary (data on file
with the Columbia Law Review). Indiana boundaries were downloaded from TIGER/Line
Shapefile, 2013, State, Indiana, Current County Subdivision State-based, Data.gov,
http://catalog.data.gov/dataset/tiger-line-shapefile-2013-state-indiana-current-county-
subdivision-state-based (data on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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the poorest places and the places most susceptible to violence. The loss
of faith in the police in the highest-homicide areas extends to a broader
loss of faith in many of the city’s institutions, from schools to courts to
the police.280 Police abuse and impunity go hand in hand to create
deeply felt cynicism among the residents.281 Accompanying this despair is
severe economic deprivation and isolation.282 Like New York City and
L.A. neighborhoods, Chicago’s poorest and most violent neighborhoods
also exemplify the concept of the poverty trap.283 The robust science
showing the connections between neighborhoods and socioeconomic
deprivation can be applied in multiples to Chicago: The extremes of its
violence spike in the past two years mirror the extremes and the breadth
of its concentrated poverty and segregation that has persisted over
decades.
B. Lessons and Next Steps
In this symposium, Professor Meares echoes the President’s Task
Force on 21st Century Policing and concludes that police need to
commit more to building trust within the communities they serve.284 She
is hardly alone in this. In an October 2015 speech in Chicago, FBI
Director Comey spoke of “two lines: one line is law enforcement and the
other line is the folks we serve and protect, especially in communities of
280. See, e.g., Denisa R. Superville & Stephen Sawchuk, In Chicago School Funding
Battles, Human Costs Are Steep, EdWeek (May 17, 2016), http://www.edweek.org/
ew/articles/2016/05/18/in-chicago-school-funding-battles-human-costs.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (noting parents’ frustration with the “tiered education system
where students on the North Side and in selective-enrollment schools get needed
resources while those on the West and South sides ‘get the crumbs’”).
281. N.Y. Times & Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Poll of Chicago: April 21 – May 3,
2016, at 7 (2016), http://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2824824/Chicago-Trn-
Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/S3VM-9V5E] (noting only 54% of those polled believe calling
the police when something illegal is happening will make the situation better).
282. See Robert J. Sampson, Great American City 46 (2012) (noting factors of social
inequality are often associated with geographic racial isolation in Chicago
neighborhoods); Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush & Felton Earls,
Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 Science
918, 918–19 (1997) (proposing an explanation for the link between higher rates of
violence in neighborhoods and low socioeconomic status and residential instability); Scott
J. South & Kyle D. Crowder, Neighborhood Effects on Family Formation: Concentrated
Poverty and Beyond, 64 Am. Soc. Rev. 113, 115 (1999) (discussing concentration effects
from social isolation of underserved neighborhoods); see also Donna L. Franklin, Susan E.
Smith & William E.P. McMiller, Correlates of Marital Status Among African American
Mothers in Chicago Neighborhoods of Concentrated Poverty, 57 J. Marriage & Fam. 141,
150 (1995) (noting the youngest and most economically disadvantaged African American
mothers were also the most residentially isolated group).
283. Sampson & Morenoff, supra note 83, at 198–201 (describing the persistence of
poverty and the durability of its social effects in Chicago neighborhoods).
284. Meares, The Path Forward, supra note 76.
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color.”285 He worried that “those two lines are arcing away from each
other, at an increasing rate.”286
This Essay contends that this extends to trust for homicide
investigations. L.A., New York City and Chicago are not alone in
experiencing low clearance rates owing in part to citizen distrust and
withdrawal. The Baltimore Sun opined on the centrality of clearance rates
for public safety:
Clearance rates in the United States have been in decline for
years, but the national average is still better than 20 points
higher than Baltimore’s rate . . . . Cases that aren’t cleared by
police are too often cleared by the streets, leading to the type of
reciprocal killings that plague Baltimore.287
Clearance rates matter in reassuring people that police are dedi-
cated to their safety and that they can deliver on promises of security.
This is especially important in an era of proactive policing, when there
are implicit tradeoffs between aggressive policing and dignity.288 As these
three case studies show, the trust and cooperation of citizens are essential
to reducing murder by leveraging citizen cooperation in homicide
investigations. Nearly fifteen years ago, as homicide rates were plunging
in most cities, Professors Janice Plunket and Richard Lundman suggested
that “the significantly lower clearance rates in Black census tracts and
integrated census tracts are a function of less trust and less cooperation
and information from citizens.”289 They noted, “[w]hen people are
reluctant to talk to homicide detectives, when they are uneasy about
telling homicide detectives what they saw, what they know, and what they
suspect, the necessary result is lower clearance rates.”290
All three case studies point toward the importance for police to shift
their focus from petty crimes, which have become the core of the new
285. Comey, Remarks at University of Chicago, supra note 79.
286. Id.
287. See Editorial, Chicago’s Homicide Crisis Gets National Attention but Baltimore’s
Is Much Worse, Balt. Sun (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
opinion/editorial/bs-ed-chicago-baltimore-20170103-story.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
288. Tyler et al., Teachable Moments, supra note 182; Jeffrey Fagan, Tom R. Tyler &
Tracey L. Meares, Street Stops and Police Legitimacy in New York 210 (Columbia Univ.,
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14-514, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2795175 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (“Targeting harm, then, encompasses both an innocence
harm plus the procedural indignity of being targeted as criminal with what appears to the
person stopped to be more of a hunch or an assumption than a reasonable basis.”).
289. Janice L. Puckett & Richard J. Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances:
Multivariate Analysis of a More Complete Conceptual Framework, 40 J. Res. Crime &
Delinq. 171, 185 (2003).
290. Id.; see also Susan Clampet-Lundquist, Patrick J. Carr & Maria J. Kefalas, The
Sliding Scale of Snitching: A Qualitative Examination of Snitching in Three Philadelphia
Communities, 30 Soc. F. 265, 267–70 (2015) (describing the reasons witnesses or victims of
crimes choose not to contact or cooperate with police).
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policing, toward stronger efforts in homicide investigations. The lesson is
that the most appropriate strategic response to homicide spikes, if not
epidemics, may have less to do with the number of police than with how
those police are deployed.291
Homicide and nonfatal shootings in small social and physical spaces
are contagious.292 Many of the processes assumed to reflect the features
of a place, a structural view, may actually be the product of social
interactions that take place in those dense social spaces. This suggests a
process of social contagion in which behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs are
spread through social contacts: exchanges of status, conflict between or
within social networks, or reciprocal perceptions of risk.293
Guns appear to be the “host” in homicide epidemics.294 Disrupting
the retaliatory killings in dense social networks by removing murderers is
291. See Steven Mello, Police and Crime: Evidence from COPS 2.0, at 27 (2016)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2812701 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (reporting that increases in the number of police appear to reduce murders
by a small fraction, between 0.3–0.4 per officer); see also Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary,
Are US Cities Underpoliced? Theory and Evidence 35 (2013), http://eml.berkeley.edu/
~jmccrary/chalfin_mccrary2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/W4VT-ZVM5] (discussing a series
of measurement-error-corrected estimates and suggesting increases in police help to
reduce violent crime, such as murder). In fact, the 2016 homicide clearance rate by the
Baltimore Police Department was 38%, well below the national average of 62%. Adam May,
Baltimore County Police Clearing Homicides at Unprecedented Rate, WBAL-TV (Dec. 29,
2016), http://www.wbaltv.com/article/baltimore-county-police-clearing-homicides-
at-unprecedented-rate/8544960 [http://perma.cc/9FSS-WVCZ]. In contrast to the low
clearance rate in the City of Baltimore, the clearance rate in the surrounding areas of
Baltimore County was 82.4%. Id.
292. See, e.g., Green et al., supra note 257, at e6 (reporting that gunshot violence
follows an process of social contagion that is transmitted through social interactions, with
an influence that is greater than the vulnerabilities to violence from living in conditions of
social isolation and economic deprivation); Andrew V. Papachristos, Christopher
Wildeman & Elizabeth Roberto, Tragic but Not Random: The Social Contagion of
Nonfatal Gunshot Injuries, 125 Soc. Sci. & Med. 139, 140 (2014) (finding “nonfatal
gunshot injuries are far more concentrated than previously thought” and “the probability
of victimization is strongly associated with network exposure to nonfatal gunshot victims,”
leading to the inference that gun violence spreads through processes of social
contagion . . . concentrated in risky networks and are associated with specific behaviors”).
293. Green et al., supra note 257, at e2.
294. K. Christoffel, Firearm Injuries: Epidemic Then, Endemic Now, 97 Am. J. Pub.
Health 626, 626 (2007) (tracing the spread of gun injuries as an epidemic followed by a
decline to a stable pattern over time); see also Cohen & Tita, supra note 108, at 457
(noting that youth participating in crack markets “increasingly carry guns and use them to
settle interpersonal disputes, thereby spreading gun violence more broadly among the
youth population”); Daniel Cork, Examining Space–Time Interaction in City-Level
Homicide Data: Crack Markets and the Diffusion of Guns Among Youth, 15 J. Quantitative
Criminology 379, 383 (1999) (explaining that firearms are “tool[s] of the trade” in crack
markets because of the need for dealers to resort to self-help); Fagan & Davies, supra note
164, at 142 (“The role of guns in homicide may explain why gun homicides are more
likely to show a contagious pattern than violence, generally.”); Jeffrey Fagan, Deanna L.
Wilkinson & Garth Davies, The Social Contagion of Violence, in Cambridge Handbook of
Violent Behavior 688, 689 (2007) (“Although disease spreads through a host and agent . . .
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a logical step in reducing murder risk. Providing exit paths through a
combination of incentives and deterrence has also proven valuable in
reducing homicide rates among former gun offenders.295
Perceived injustices, including both “petty indignities” and egre-
gious acts of police violence, can disincentivize citizens from cooperating
with police.296 And the risks of those perceived injustices appear to be
social contagion involves the mutual influence of individuals within social networks who
turn to each other for cues and behavioral tools that reflect the contingencies of specific
situations . . . .”); Elizabeth Griffiths & Jorge M. Chavez, Communities, Street Guns and
Homicide Trajectories in Chicago, 1980–1995: Merging Methods for Examining Homicide
Trends Across Space and Time, 42 Criminology 941, 946 (2004) (noting “changing
patterns of firearm violence” and focusing on the “subsequent impact on changing rates
of both total and neighborhood-specific homicide”); David Hemenway et al., Gun
Carrying Among Adolescents, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1996, at 39, 47–48 (finding
“carrying firearms makes other students feel less safe, which increases the likelihood that
they will in turn carry guns” and concluding “results of contagion modeling suggest that
small initial changes in gun carrying can have multiplicative effects”); Papachristos,
Murder by Structure, supra note 258, at 75–76 (“Individual murders between gangs create
an institutionalized network of group conflict—sustained patterns of interaction—net of
any individual’s participation or motive. Within this network, murders spread through a
process of social contagion as gangs respond to threats by evaluating the highly visible
actions of others in their local networks.”); Papachristos et al., Social Networks and the
Risk of Gunshot Injury, 89 J. Urb. Health 992, 993 (2012) (noting that “the normative
conditions surrounding gun use are transmitted through processes of peer influence,
especially among young men with criminal histories”); Deanna L. Wilkinson & Jeffrey
Fagan, The Role of Firearms in Violence Scripts: The Dynamics of Gun Events Among
Adolescent Males, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1996, at 55, 57 (“[T]he presence of
firearms contributes to increasingly alarming homicide rates among inner-city
adolescents.”); Deanna L. Wilkinson & Jeffrey Fagan, A Theory of Violent Events, in The
Process and Structure of Crime: Criminal Events and Crime Analysis 169, 178–80 (Robert
F. Meier & Leslie W. Kennedy eds., 2001) (exploring the “situational contexts of violent
events” and asserting “[v]iolent events appear to be situated transactions that reflect the
interactions of the parties and the features of both the social and situational contexts”).
295. See Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons:
Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 223, 224
(2007) (discussing how Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods program reduced homicide
rates by more than 35%); Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Why
Do Criminals Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and Social Networks on Active
Gun Offenders, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 397, 399–400 (2012) (using studies
conducted among active gun offenders to conclude that individuals in this group differed
in perspective about compliance with the law); Danielle Wallace et al., Desistance and
Legitimacy: The Impact of Offender Notification Meetings on Recidivism Among High
Risk Offenders, 33 J.Q. 1237, 1239 (2015) (“Research supports the efficacy of crime
prevention programs which incorporate procedural justice and legitimacy into a focused
deterrence approach.”).
296. See Bell, supra note 205, at 5 (“The empirical evidence shows that these feelings
of distrust manifest themselves in reduced likelihood among these groups to obey law
enforcement officers’ commands, and to cooperate with officers to help them solve
crimes.”); Mark Berg et al., Cynical Streets: Neighborhood Social Processes and
Perceptions of Criminal Injustice, 54 Criminology 520, 521–22 (2016) (arguing that
“negative or unfavorable police-citizen encounters are more likely to occur in
neighborhoods with greater levels of cynicism”); Desmond et al., Police Violence and
Citizen Crime Reporting, supra note 205, at 870 (finding “publicized cases of police
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greater under the aggressive and proactive tactics of the “new
policing.”297 Indeed, the risks of policing indignities in a community
depend quite a bit on the city’s policing model—a model over which a
community likely has little influence.298 But dignitarian insults are only
one consequence of the new policing. An equally important cost is the
loss of effectiveness in crime control. Two empirical studies of New York
City’s aggressive policing model show few returns to crime control from
saturated investigative stops. One study employed an experimental
design to show that while a high rate of stops based on an expansive and
subjective definition of reasonable suspicion had minimal effects on
crime, a higher rate of stops based narrowly on factors approximating a
probable cause standard substantially reduced crime.299 A second test
used a longitudinal (panel) design and reached the same conclusion:
Stops based on probable cause significantly reduce crime.300 Both studies
argue for a shift in police practice away from inflated notions of
suspicion and toward a more specific and narrow notion of “suspicion”
based on probable cause. In New York City, the setting for these studies,
the same expansive policing tactics generally did not recover weapons or
contraband or lead to arrests of active offenders for felony crimes.301
violence against unarmed black men have a clear and significant impact on citizen crime
reporting”); Eric A. Stewart et al., Neighborhood Racial Context and Perceptions of Police
Based Racial Discrimination Among Black Youth, 47 Criminology 487, 849–50 (2009)
(recognizing that “neighborhood social context has been shown to be integral to shaping
race relations, police behavior, and police-citizen encounters”).
297. See Jeffrey Fagan, Dignity is the New Legitimacy, in The New Criminal Justice
Thinking 308, 313 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) (noting that
“front-end encounters with the police under the ‘new policing’ are fertile grounds for
petty or pointless indignities or gratuitous humiliations”); Jonathan Simon, The Second
Coming of Dignity, in The New Criminal Justice Thinking, supra, 275, 281 (noting that the
“severity of criminal justice treatment[] has created a gulf between the communities
harmed and humiliated by criminal justice encounters and those that feel protected and
respected by those encounters”); Bowers, supra note 213, at 992–95 (“In the age of order-
maintenance policing . . . it is inevitable that some not insignificant number of low-level,
full-custodial arrests reflects very bad choices (or worse).”); Jeffrey Fagan, Indignities of
Order Maintenance 44 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting that “indignities, including those that carry a racial component, can
undermine the ties of citizens to law and the moral and social norms that underlie them”).
298. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, The Duty for Responsible
Administration and the Problem of Police Accountability, 33 Yale J. on Reg. 165, 210–11
(2016) (finding “post-bureaucratic organization takes markedly different forms with
correspondingly different implications for accountability”).
299. See MacDonald, Fagan & Geller, supra note 233.
300. See Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. Chi. Legal F. 43, 46 (“The analyses
show significant reduction in crime in neighborhoods . . . with greater numbers of
probable cause stops, and ratios of probable cause stops to other stops.”).
301. See, e.g., Floyd I, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (using statistical data to
demonstrate the unlikelihood of discovering weapons or contraband); see also Meares,
Programming Errors, supra note 44, at 162–63 (2015) (explaining the theory that stop
and frisk carried out “en masse as a program” is inconsistent with Terry’s authorization for
such stops in the case of individual incidents).
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The new policing logic focuses on the wrong behaviors and
externalizes inefficiency costs to impacted citizens in the form of
pointless stops and a range of perceived injustices. The turn to an
investigative model can reverse the distraction of police from minor
crimes and infractions and restore focus on violence and murder. In
other words, if police do not “sweat the little stuff” but rather “go after
the hard stuff,” they will reap dividends in the trust and cooperation of
the people most affected by that violence.
CONCLUSION
All too many cities experienced recent increases in homicides. This
Essay suggests that, given existing information, there is no reason to
believe that these increases presage a new homicide epidemic and a
return to the era of elevated homicide rates that persisted in many U.S.
cities over three decades through the mid-1990s. These spikes could be
momentary upticks in the long-term decline that has been ongoing for
over two decades; they could also signal a new era of unpredictable and
random surges and declines in homicide across cities during an
otherwise stable pattern over time.
Homicide spikes appear to be more volatile in smaller cities, with the
exception of the recent severe homicide outbreak in Chicago. Closer
examination of the conditions in neighborhoods in three large cities
shows the intersection of policing tactics and social contexts in which the
concurrent withdrawal of citizens and police from the co-production of
security has profound consequences for the control of violence. This
Essay argues for a shift in policing tactics from order maintenance and
proactive police contacts—with their potential to produce injustices and
indignities—to a focus on investigations of homicide, with the promise
both of bringing offenders to justice and of restoring trust in the police.
